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Religious Institutionalism in a Canadian 
Context
VICTOR M. MUÑIZ-FRATICELLI* & LAWRENCE DAVID**
Does freedom of religion protect religious institutions or does it only protect the individual 
religious conscience? Canadian jurisprudence after the enactment of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms takes a decidedly individualist turn, deliberately avoiding the question 
of the rights of religious institutions. This individualist focus neglects the historical trajectory 
of religious freedom, the social understanding of religious faith by religious adherents 
themselves, and the institutional structures in which religion emerges and develops (and 
through which it is ultimately protected). An institutional account of religious liberty can 
complement the individualist account, as it better explains the legal order, better reflects 
actual religious practice, and better preserves both institutional and individual religious 
liberty. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada go some way towards correcting 
this individualist bias but balk at resolving the legal status of religious institutions. This 
persistent ambiguity will prove problematic in controversies over religious autonomy already 
making their way through the courts.
La liberté de religion protège-t-elle les institutions religieuses ou uniquement la conscience 
religieuse individuelle? Depuis la promulgation de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, 
la jurisprudence canadienne prend décidément une tournure vers l’individualisme et évite 
délibérément la question des droits des institutions religieuses. Cette mise à l’avant-scène 
de l’individualisme néglige l’évolution historique de la liberté de religion, l’interprétation 
sociale que se font de leur foi les fidèles eux-mêmes et la structure institutionnelle dans 
laquelle prend forme et se développe la religion, structure qui permet de la protéger. Un 
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constat institutionnel de la liberté de religion peut compléter le constat individualiste, car 
il explique mieux l’ordre juridique, reflète mieux la pratique religieuse véritable et protège 
mieux la liberté de religion tant individuelle qu’institutionnelle. Des jugements récents de la 
Cour suprême du Canada concourent à corriger ce parti pris individualiste, mais rechignent 
à résoudre le statut juridique des institutions religieuses. Cette ambigüité persistante posera 
problème pour résoudre la controverse entourant l’autonomie religieuse, qui est de plus en 
plus soumise aux tribunaux.
DOES FREEDOM OF RELIGION protect religious institutions or does it only 
protect the individual religious conscience? The question has gained increasing 
importance in recent years, as religious organizations have sought exemption 
from a variety of generally applicable laws and regulations or have demanded 
deference to their internal structures of governance in matters of internal dispute. 
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Recent judicial decisions,1 legislative initiatives,2 and policy recommendations3 in 
both the United States and the European Union suggest that “there is no more 
important issue in law and religion today than institutional religious autonomy.”4
 In Canada, legislative and jurisprudential practices have long recognized 
and made room for religious institutions, but the historical, conceptual, and 
doctrinal grounds for recognition have not been subject to sustained theoretical 
and normative inquiry. Before the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms5 (“Charter”) in 1982, little attention was paid to whether religious 
institutions themselves were the subjects of rights and could claim the protection 
of religious liberty—intrinsically or as mediating entities necessary for the full 
exercise of the religion of individual congregants—or whether all religious rights 
could be reduced to the protection of conscience. The prevalence of official 
support for religious bodies, some of which derived direct financial support from 
the state both before and after Confederation, further obscured any theoretical 
discussion of the rights of religious institutions.6 
After the Charter, the judicial discourse around freedom of religion in 
Canada took a decidedly individualist turn. “This Court,” writes Justice Iacobucci 
in Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, “has long articulated an expansive definition of 
1. See Zachary R Calo, “Constructing the Secular: Law and Religion Jurisprudence in Europe 
and the United States” (2014) European University Institute Working Paper No RSCAS 
2014/94. Calo cites a number of United States Supreme Court cases. See Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 
US ___ (2012) [Hosanna-Tabor]; Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc, 573 US ___ (2014) 
[Burwell]. Calo also cites a number of cases from the European Court of Human Rights. 
See Obst v Germany, No 425/03 (23 September 2010); Schüth v Germany, No 1620/03 
(23 September 2010); Siebenhaar v Germany, No 18136/02 (3 February 2011); Fernández 
Martínez v Spain, No 56030/07 (12 June 2014).
2. For United States statutes, see e.g. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, USC tit 42 § 2000bb-1 
(1993) [Restoration Act]; Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, USC tit 42 § 
2000cc (2000) [Land Use Act]. European legislation on the subject varies widely by country.
3. See e.g. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights, Guidelines for Review of Legislation Pertaining to Religion 
or Belief (Venice: OSCE/ODIHR, 2004); Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Guidelines on the Legal 
Personality of Religious or Belief Communities (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2014).
4. Calo, supra note 1 at 15.
5. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, 
c 11 [Charter].
6. See e.g. Dobie v Presbyterian Church of Canada, [1882] UKPC 4, 7 AC 136 [Dobie] 
(regarding the allocation of assets and government emoluments of the Presbyterian Church 
after Confederation, which the Privy Council decided primarily on the provincial authority 
to amend or repeal pre-Confederation statutes).
(2015) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL1052
freedom of religion, which revolves around the notion of personal choice and 
individual autonomy and freedom.”7 The Supreme Court of Canada has had 
several opportunities to resolve the question of whether freedom of religion 
protects religious institutions, but it has avoided giving a direct answer. This 
silence has resulted, at times, in doctrinal confusion and recurrent controversies, 
prominent subjects of which include Trinity Western University (“TWU”) 
(first over its teacher training program and currently over its establishment of a 
Christian law school)8 and Loyola High School in Montreal (in relation to which 
the Court put the question of institutional freedom of religion to the parties but 
split on whether and how to answer the question).9
A purely individualist conception of freedom of religion is broad, but 
it is also shallow. It accepts a wide scope of practices and beliefs as deserving 
protection but does not consider the historical trajectory of religious freedom or 
religious adherents’ social understanding of religious faith. Nor does it consider 
the institutional structures in which religious practice emerges and develops 
and through which it is ultimately protected—structures that are sometimes 
constitutive of religious practice. Because of this limitation, a purely individualist 
conception of freedom of religion excludes important manifestations of religious 
life in Canada, and does so unequally, since it privileges certain modes of belief 
and forms of organization over others. More importantly, an individualist 
conception renders unintelligible much of the law applicable to religious freedom 
and makes resolution of some controversies more difficult by denying the courts 
important conceptual instruments. As a result, judicial emphasis on the individual 
aspects of religious liberty and inattention to institutional practice have created 
incongruence between legal discourse and practice, ignored actual religious 
traditions, and potentially undermined, rather than preserved, religious freedom.
We do not mean to give an exhaustive account of all legislation and case law 
pertaining to religious organizations in Canada.10 Indeed, our thesis is not that 
7. 2004 SCC 47 at para 40, [2004] 2 SCR 551 [Amselem], citing R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd, 
[1985] 1 SCR 295, 18 DLR (4th) 321 [Big M].
8. For the teacher training program, see British Columbia College of Teachers v Trinity Western 
University, 2001 SCC 31, [2001] 1 SCR 772 [Trinity Western] (approving the program but 
not deciding whether TWU could claim section 2(a) protection). For a discussion on the 
legal debate surrounding TWU’s law school, see Elaine Craig, “The Case for the Federation 
of Law Societies Rejecting Trinity Western University’s Proposed Law Degree Program” 
(2013) 25:1 CJWL 148; Dwight Newman, “On the Trinity Western University Controversy: 
An Argument for a Christian Law School in Canada” (2013) 22:3 Const Forum Const 1.
9. Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12, [2015] 1 SCR 613 [Loyola].
10. For a most thorough account, see MH Ogilvie, Religious Institutions and the Law in Canada, 
3rd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010).
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the institutionalist perspective would have changed the outcome in any given 
case decided after the adoption of the Charter—the nature of most of those 
controversies allowed the Court to sidestep the institutional issue. Rather, we 
argue that the sole focus on individual religious freedom has distorted the law’s 
apprehension of religious experience.11 We merely seek to introduce an alternative 
account of the proper objects of protection under the constitutional guarantee 
of freedom of religion and to demonstrate that this account, as a complement to 
constitutional theory, better explains the present legal order, better reflects actual 
religious practice, and better preserves both institutional and individual religious 
freedom. We do this, first, by briefly introducing the religious institutionalist 
position and distinguishing it from its contrary; second, by presenting a 
theoretical or conceptual account of the institutional dimension of religion; third, 
by proposing a historical reconstruction of the concept of religious freedom that 
demonstrates the centrality of its institutional protections; and finally, by tracing 
the institutional protection of religion though Canadian jurisprudence from 
Confederation, though the Charter era, to present controversies.
I. AN INSTITUTIONALIST ACCOUNT OF FREEDOM OF 
RELIGION
As we said, attention to the institutional aspects of freedom of religion 
complements, rather than supplants, the current exclusive focus on individual 
religious belief. It nonetheless requires that we consider different ways of thinking 
about how religious freedom has been historically understood and about the 
values and practices that it has been intended to protect. The autonomy of 
religious institutions before the civil power has been the subject of legal, political, 
and theological argument for centuries, both in movements that reaffirmed 
the claims of religious institutions and those that, while acknowledging those 
claims, opposed their legal recognition. Yet what we refer to as “religious 
institutionalism”—a standpoint in normative legal theory concerned with the 
structure and content of freedom of religion—is relatively recent. 
Religious institutionalism refers to a family of arguments that affirms, albeit 
on diverse grounds, that the legal principle of religious liberty protects and ought 
11. This presents a problem for coming controversies, some already in the courts, where the 
issues at stake involve the ability of religious institutions (i.e., schools, charities) to thrive 
while preserving their autonomy in the face of state regulation or where congregants dispute 
control of the institution with the leadership. These issues deserve thorough discussion but 
are beyond the present article’s scope.
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to protect religious organizations directly, allowing them to claim rights that are 
not reducible to or directly derived from the individual rights of their members.12 
The institutionalist position was first articulated in American jurisprudence over 
three decades ago and has gained increasing academic, legislative, and judicial 
support. In one of the first explicit statements interpreting the US Constitution 
to recognize an institutional dimension, Douglas Laycock argued that “[t]here is 
a right to church autonomy in the free exercise clause [of the US Constitution]. 
… Any interference with the autonomy of these organizations jeopardizes free 
exercise rights of their members, including the free development of religious 
doctrine.”13 Some other scholars (and lately, Laycock himself ) also argued that 
government interference with religious institutions did not only violate the right 
of individual believers to practice their faith in associations but also contravened 
the prohibition on state establishment of religion.14 Thus Carl Esbeck observes 
that “[t]he logic of the [US Supreme] Court’s opinions inexorably leads to the 
conclusion that religious organizations have … a unique institutional competency, 
not the mere sum of the derivative rights of their individual members.”15
More recently, religious institutionalist scholars have taken a more abstract 
philosophical and historical approach that makes their argument more readily 
applicable across national borders. These scholars defend the constitutional 
protection of institutional religious freedom because it inhibits the state from 
asserting “jurisdiction over the transcendent and extra-temporal commitments 
of its citizens,”16 because it captures the full meaning of religious liberty as it 
12. Over the last thirty years, there has been an explosion in religious institutionalist scholarship, 
mainly in the United States. For both sides of the debate, see Richard C Schragger & Micah 
Schwartzman, “Against Religious Institutionalism” (2013) 99:5 Va L Rev 917 [Schragger & 
Schwartzman, “Against”]; Paul Horwitz, “Defending (Religious) Institutionalism” (2013) 
99:5 Va L Rev 1049 (2013). 
13. “Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations 
and the Right to Church Autonomy” (1981) 81:7 Colum L Rev 1373 at 1416-17. The 
Free Exercise Clause is one of the two aspects of religious freedom in the US Constitution, 
the other being the Establishment Clause. Together, they read, “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” See US 
Const amend I. 
14. Douglas Laycock, “Church Autonomy Revisited” (2009) 7 Geo JL & Pub Pol’y 253.
15. “The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power” (1989) 84:1 
Iowa L Rev 1 at 54.
16. Ira C Lupu & Robert W Tuttle, “The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our 
Constitutional Order” (2002) 47:1 Vill L Rev 37 at 40.
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has historically developed though concepts like libertas ecclesiae,17 or because it 
recognizes the actual context in which religious beliefs and practices emerge.18 
Religious institutionalism is contrasted to religious individualism, which 
understands religious liberty as protecting only the individual in his or her religious 
conscience and practices and assumes that any rights of religious organizations 
are ultimately reducible to rights-claims that can be entirely protected through 
the individual rights of members. The articulation of the religious institutionalist 
position has provoked opposition from scholars who take issue with ontological 
claims about the status of religious groups as rights-bearers, the historical and 
theological bases of church autonomy, and the special solicitude that religion 
received in American (and Canadian) law.19 Some of these disagreements go 
directly to the question of whether organizations can possess the attributes (moral, 
psychological, or otherwise) that qualify them as potential rights-bearers.20 Most 
critiques, however, are concerned instead with the effects that greater protection 
of religious institutions would have on public policy, especially the application 
of anti-discrimination and health benefits laws to employees, the offering of 
services to the general public, and the liability of churches and ministers for 
tortious conduct.21 In addition, the strongly institutionalist account is subject 
to vigorous debate in cases of church schism, in which one party might raise the 
17. Richard W Garnett, “Religious Freedom, Church Autonomy, and Constitutionalism” (2009) 
57 Drake L Rev 901; Richard W Garnett, “Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional 
Understanding of the Religion Clauses” (2008) 53:2 Vill L Rev 273.
18. Paul Horwitz, First Amendment Institutions (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
2012) at 174-93 [Horwitz, First Amendment].
19. Schragger and Schwartzman, “Against,” supra note 12; Richard Schragger & Micah 
Schwartzman, “Some Realism about Corporate Rights” in Micah Schwartzman, Chad 
Flanders & Zoë Robinson, eds, The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016) 345; Richard C Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, “Lost in 
Translation: A Dilemma for Freedom of the Church” (2013) 21:1 J Contemp Legal Issues 
165; Micah Schwartzman, “What If Religion Isn’t Special?” (2012) 79:4 U Chicago L Rev 
1351; Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Dignity, History, and Religious-Group Rights” (2013) 21 J 
Contemp Legal Issues 273; Frederick Mark Gedicks “True Lies: Canossa As Myth” (2013) 21 
J Contemp Legal Issues 133.
20. See Victor M Muñiz-Fraticelli, The Structure of Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014) ch 10 at 199ff [Muñiz-Fraticelli, Pluralism].
21. Chad Flanders, Micah Schwartzman & Zoë Robinson, “Introduction” in Schwartzman, 
Flanders & Robinson, eds, supra note 19, xiii; Schragger & Schwartzman, “Against,” supra 
note 12; Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G Van Tassell, “RFRA Exemptions from the 
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion” (2014) 49:2 
Harv CR-CLL Rev 343; Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Narrative Pluralism and Doctrinal 
Incoherence in Hosanna-Tabor” (2012) 64:2 Mercer L Rev 405; Marci A Hamilton, “Church 
Autonomy is Not a Better Path to ‘Truth’” (2006) 22:1 JL & Religion 215.
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defence of the religious organization’s institutional autonomy while the other 
grounds its claim on the institution being reducible to the voluntary association 
of individual congregants.22
The institutionalist and individualist accounts of freedom of religion both 
express important aspects of the concept—or rather concepts—of religious 
freedom in the Western legal tradition. Each captures an important dimension of 
religious practice and belief, but neither captures the phenomenon fully. Canadian 
law bearing on freedom of religion contains both individualist and institutionalist 
features, and the values it enshrines can be traced to one or the other concept of 
religious liberty. While it is theoretically possible to imagine a controversy that 
can be understood mostly in terms of one concept—say, a “solitary seeker” with 
no intent to proselytize or join with others in worship and who has little use for 
institutional conceptions23—most controversies will involve both concepts. For 
instance, hierarchical churches are often sustained by their adherents’ belief in the 
sacramental character of the churches’ structure of authority; religious groups with 
a distinct legal tradition depend on specialized courts to resolve disputes between 
adherents; and all religious organizations require some formal social activity as a 
constitutive condition of religious practice. These institutional aspects of religion 
cannot be enacted by individual consciences. Often they will be as central to 
the faith as any substantive affirmations of religious doctrine or creed; in many 
cases, serious adherence to discipline or earnest obedience to authority may 
define religious membership more than sincere belief. An institutional account 
of religion can apprehend this facet of religion in a way that an individualist 
22. See e.g. Jeffrey Hassler, “A Multitude of Sins? Constitutional Standards for Legal Resolution 
of Church Property Disputes in a Time of Escalating Intradenominational Strife” (2008) 
35:2 Pepp L Rev 399 at 402; Cameron Ellis, “Church Factionalism and Judicial Resolution: 
A Reconsideration of the Neutral-Principles Approach” (2009) 60:4 Ala L Rev 1001 at 1007. 
We will sometimes refer to religious institutions and religious officials as “ecclesiastical” and 
to religious bodies as “churches” in keeping with the literature on the subject, but this is not 
meant to exclude religious organizations that do not use these terms in self-description.
23. See e.g. Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 2013) at 167 (arguing that reliance on “a group or some organized structure of 
authority” as a basis of protection of religious freedom excludes “solitary seekers” who have 
no formal affiliation).
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account cannot. Religious individualism simply does not conform to the practice 
of many—perhaps most—religious practitioners, past or present.24
Moreover, religious individualism cannot fully explain the current state 
of positive law, whether the statutory recognition of religious institutional 
authority or the judicial interpretation of the constitutional or statutory text 
that acknowledges such authority. This shortcoming exists, in part, because 
the current state of positive law is not the product of, or only of, the sudden 
revolutionary discovery of religious toleration in the European Enlightenment. 
It is the result of a gradual development of religious, political, and legal thought 
that can be traced back to the medieval origins of modern constitutionalism 
and which the achievements of the Enlightenment came to supplement, rather 
than supplant. The reduction of the idea of religious liberty to an individualist 
account both atrophies the Canadian constitutional heritage—depriving it of 
the intellectual tools to adequately protect religious practice and belief—and 
necessitates aggressive intervention in so many aspects of social life that it puts 
other freedoms at risk.
The protection of individual conscience is a great historical achievement, and 
an institutionalist account of religious freedom does not and should not displace 
it. But both accounts can and should complement each other. Some controversies 
will not be completely captured by either concept or may lead to tension between 
institutions and their adherents, but no more so than now. A clearer conceptual 
picture might lead us to understand these conflicts better. Perry Dane has written 
of a “specter of intractability” that haunts the confrontation of law and religion.25 
If we accept the metaphor, it may not be possible, or desirable, to exorcise this 
ghost, but we should perhaps seek to gain some insight from its hauntings.
II. RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONALISM AND THE CONCEPT OF 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
The current concept of limited government asserts that liberty is achieved when 
the state abstains from interfering within a sphere of action and belief and leaves 
24. For example, Roderick Macdonald has discussed the debates between Thomas More 
and Martin Luther, early on, and between John Henry Cardinal Newman and Christian 
evangelicals, much later, regarding the importance of authoritative institutions in religious 
practice. See Roderick A Macdonald, “Custom Made—For a Non-chirographic Critical 
Legal Pluralism” (2011) 26:2 CJLS 301 at 310.
25. “Constitutional Law and Religion” in Dennis Patterson, ed, A Companion to Philosophy of 
Law and Legal Theory, 2nd ed (Chichester, UK: Blackwell, 2010) 119 at 128.
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individuals within that sphere to follow their conscience. But for many religious 
people, this is not a complete description of religious freedom. While claims of 
conscience simpliciter may be upheld by a direct appeal to reason, religious practice 
and belief require affirmative submission to a transcendent external authority. 
This authority is usually mediated through authoritative religious institutions 
that are constitutive of, and not incidental to, religious practice and belief. This 
institutional model of religious freedom is defensible on both conceptual and 
historical grounds. In this section, we focus mainly on the conceptual argument 
by interrogating the dominant narratives of religious liberty in liberal thought. 
We present the historical argument in Part III, below.
Religious liberty is recognized as one of the unqualifiedly positive 
achievements of modern civilization. It stands at the origin of the foundational 
narratives of liberalism. But as with all foundational narratives, the prevailing 
story of freedom of religion in the West is not a straightforward catalog of actions 
and events, but a morality tale that elevates some aspects of religious liberty and 
downplays, reinterprets, or excludes others. The individual conscience, religious 
or not, is the protagonist of this story, while the gradual process of convincing the 
state to abandon religious establishment and protect the rights of conscience is its 
plot. It is a plot filled with individual dissenters—Martin Luther at Wittenberg, 
Miguel Servet in Geneva, Roger Williams in Rhode Island—unfairly persecuted 
during the Wars of Religion and their aftermath but ultimately triumphant in 
securing societies where conscience is centrally protected. The most influential 
contemporary account of liberal thought, John Rawls’s theory of justice, 
adopts this foundational narrative and cements its continuity through the 
primacy of individual civil and political rights in liberal democracy. In Political 
Liberalism, Rawls writes:
Thus, the historical origin of political liberalism (and of liberalism more generally) 
is the Reformation and its aftermath, with the long controversies over religious 
toleration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Something like the modern 
understanding of liberty of conscience and freedom of thought began then.26
Rawls is more nuanced in his Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy.27 He 
identifies three historical roots of liberalism, of which the Protestant Reformation 
and the Wars of Religion is but one, although perhaps the most important.28 
26. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) at xxiv. See also Ronald Beiner, Civil Religion: 
A Dialogue in the History of Political Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2011) at 283-300.
27. (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2007). 
28. Ibid at 11.
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The second, the rise of the middle class and “the establishment of constitutional 
regimes of limited monarchy,” is at least parallel to the Reformation.29 The 
third, “the winning of the working classes to democracy and majority rule,” 
occurred several centuries later.30 If the central role of the medieval church in first 
formulating the legal and political limits to monarchical power is acknowledged, 
the constitutional foundations of liberalism actually predate the religious strife of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by four to twelve hundred years.31 And 
the role of religious societies in organizing tradesmen and workers was evident 
both in medieval guild life and in nineteenth century syndicalism.32 Other 
Rawlsians, however, have persisted with the prevailing narrative. In Multicultural 
Citizenship, Will Kymlicka notes that “[l]iberalism and toleration are closely 
related, both historically and conceptually,” given their common origin in the 
Wars of Religion, but,
[I]f liberalism can indeed be seen as an extension of the principle of religious 
tolerance, it is important to recognize that religious tolerance in the West has taken a 
very specific form—namely, the idea of individual freedom of conscience … . There 
are other forms of toleration which are not liberal. They are based on the idea that 
each religious group should be free to organize its community as it see fit, including 
along non-liberal lines.33
Elsewhere, Kymlicka dismisses all corporate claims to religious autonomy as 
illegitimate in a liberal society, unequivocally stating that “the real issue … is the 
pre-modern legal doctrine of libertas ecclesiae, which gives religious organizations 
broad exemptions from equality rights.”34 By excluding any institutional element 
from the historical narrative of religious freedom, Kymlicka is able to elide 
religion and culture and protect religious practices through group-differentiated 
rights (rights ascribed to individuals by virtue of their membership in a particular 
group or possession of a kind of status). He thereby denies religious organizations 
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. The dating depends on whether one takes the Investitures Controversy of the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries as the pivotal moment in Western constitutionalism or whether one reads 
back to the letters of Hosius of Cordoba in the fourth century or those of Pope Gelasius in 
the fifth, as we discuss in Part III, below.
32. After all, Pope Leo developed an account of social justice from a defence of religiously 
affiliated guilds and unions. See Pope Leo XIII, “Rerum Novarum” (15 May 1891) online: 
Libreria Editrice Vaticana <w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/
hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum.pdf>.
33. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) at 155-56. 
34. “Disentangling the Debate” in Janice Gross Stein et al, eds, Uneasy Partners: Multiculturalism 
and Rights in Canada (Waterloo, Ont: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007) 137 at 147.
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any group-rights proper (rights held by the group directly as a person in its 
own right).35 Yet as Sarah Song observes, “[m]ost of Kymlicka’s examples [of 
poly-ethnic rights] involve religious practices.”36 
The reduction of religious rights to individual claims for exemption or 
accommodation has two problematic effects: either it obscures the sources of 
the claims that individual members of groups make or else it completely ignores 
the institutional structures that allow for the emergence, development, and 
protection of religious identities. For instance, consider Jewish kosher or Muslim 
halal dietary restrictions or even the milder Catholic prohibition on eating meat 
during the Lenten season. To say that the believer is bound by conscience to 
abide by the dietary restriction is true, but incomplete. The claim of conscience 
is not to refrain from eating a certain kind of food, but rather to obey the law 
and the institutionally designated interpreters of that law—rabbis, imams, or 
bishops—which in turn specify the dietary practices that believers must follow. 
The long history of debate and principled (but not secessionist) dissent within 
religious groups shows that disagreement among religious authorities, or between 
authorities and believers, need not lead to schism or even disobedience. Continued 
submission is compatible with principled dissent, especially when religious 
institutions are not viewed as instrumental but rather as integral to religious faith 
and practice.37 Even schism is hardly ever solitary, nor does it lead to splendid 
isolation. Most often a division within a religious institution emerges from a 
disagreement over the boundaries of community or the identity of authority, not 
whether to have community at all or to do away with authority altogether.
35. Victor M Muñiz-Fraticelli discusses the error of reducing religion to culture. See Victor M 
Muñiz-Fraticelli, “The Distinctiveness of Religious Liberty” in René Provost, ed, Mapping the 
Legal Boundaries of Belonging: Religion and Multiculturalism from Israel to Canada (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014) ch 5 at 99ff. See also Mary Anne Waldron, Free to Believe: 
Rethinking Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Canada (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 
2013) ch 3 at 54ff. Waldron correctly points out that the confusion of religious freedom 
with the protection of vulnerable cultural minorities has left religious majorities singularly 
unprotected, undermining religious freedom as such.
36. Justice, Gender, and the Politics of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) at 65.
37. Charles Taylor explains that “[t]his is the connection that consists in the fact that the church 
is a sacramental communion; some of the force is carried in an expression like ‘mystical 
body.’” While Taylor has in mind the Catholic corporate conception of the church, a similar 
constitutive understanding of community pervades other religious traditions. See Charles 
Taylor, Varieties of Religious Experience Today: William James Revisited (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2002) at 24-25.
MUÑIZ-FRATICELLI & DAVID, RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONALISM IN A CANADIAN CONTEXT 1061
The dominant opinion in both the academy and the courts has tended to 
equate religious freedom with freedom of conscience, or at least to read the concept 
of religion expansively to cover beliefs and practices beyond those commonly 
associated with the historical conception of religion.38 The Supreme Court of 
Canada has done the same, reading the guarantee of “freedom of conscience 
and religion” in section 2 of the Charter as a term of art, not as the protection of 
two different things.39 This expansive reading, however, has been coupled with a 
reductive understanding of the proper subject of that freedom and has thus come 
to conceive of freedom of religion as a normatively protected sphere of thought 
and action that encompasses the individual man or woman. In this view, any 
collective practice that is promoted or required by these thoughts and actions can 
come under the aegis of religious freedom, but only derivatively as necessary to 
the fulfillment of the discrete individual freedom of the participants.
Where does this leave those religious traditions with very strong institutional 
components? One suspects that the narrative of liberalism as a tale of the 
38. It is beyond the scope of this article to fully examine the vast emerging scholarship on the 
constitutional protection of conscience (towards which an anonymous reviewer points 
us). The view that the concept of conscience can sufficiently protect “religious conscience” 
is becoming the dominant position. See e.g. Schwartzman, supra note 19; Brian Leiter, 
Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012). But this view 
is contested. Compare Andrew Koppelman, Defending American Religious Neutrality 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2013) ch 4; Timothy Macklem, Independence 
of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) ch 3 at 68ff. Waldron likewise endorses 
a robust defence of religion (distinguishing it, for instance, from protection of minorities 
on grounds of equality) but ultimately grounds this endorsement on a broader category of 
conscience and its connection to a democratic society. See Waldron, supra note 35, ch 3 at 
54ff, ch 7 at 195ff.
39. One anonymous reviewer considers our claim that the Court has rendered the phrase 
“conscience and religion” into a term of art is overstatement. However, as we discuss in Part 
V(A), below, Dickson CJ clearly claimed that section 2(a) of the Charter protects the “single 
integrated concept of freedom of conscience and religion.” See Big M, supra note 7 at para 
120. Some lower courts, to their credit, may not be following the Court’s signals and have 
treated the terms “religion” and “conscience” separately. See McAteer et al v Attorney General 
of Canada, 2013 ONSC 5895, 117 OR (3d) 353; Roach v Canada (Minister of State for 
Multiculturalism and Citizenship, [1994] 2 FCR 406, 46 ACWS (3d) 387 (both dealing with 
conscientious objections to swearing allegiance to the Queen in the citizenship ceremony). 
See also Maurice v Canada (Attorney General) (2002), 210 DLR (4th) 186, 111 ACWS 
(3d) 472 (FCTD) (dealing with a prisoner’s request for vegetarian meals on the basis of 
conscientious ethical belief ). But none of these lower court decisions made it to the Court, 
and the Court has never issued a single judgment in which it treated freedom of conscience 
separately. The doctrinal question, in our view, remains open, but only because Dickson CJ’s 
statement should be considered obiter dictum.
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triumphal ascendancy of individual conscience is a distinctly Protestant story, 
suspicious of ecclesiastical authority over ritual or doctrine. And even then, it is a 
particularly radical Protestant story associated with the most antinomian elements 
of the Reformation, which even Martin Luther and John Calvin opposed. It is 
not that the Protestant tenor of the theory is derived from the personal faith of 
liberal theorists—religious adherence varies among scholars—but rather that it 
is inherent to the origins of the narrative itself. Individualism befits a faith that 
privileges an unmediated relationship to God, a faith of sola fide, sola scriptura, 
sola gratia,40 which emerged in reaction to a Roman Catholic Church that taught 
that grace is received through sacraments administered by ordained priests, 
that scripture is authoritatively interpreted only by the Magisterium, and that 
extra Ecclesiam nulla salus.41 The medieval order that preceded the Reformation 
was religiously united but institutionally divided; the world that would emerge 
from the Wars of Religion would eventually become religiously pluralistic, but 
politically unitary, at least within each nation-state. Religious freedom would 
come to be guaranteed not by confrontation between institutions but by moral 
principles that guide the sovereign’s conscience. As the individual religious 
believer relates directly to God, so the individual religious dissenter confronts 
the state alone when demanding tolerance and protection. At its highest point, 
religious individualism grounds a robust defence of the dissenting conscience. 
At a baser point, it denies recourse to an autonomous institutional religious 
authority—even to those who wish to submit to it—on the intolerant pretense 
that adherents have a moral obligation to pursue individual autonomy and that 
their consciences must be forced to be free.
It is by design that this ecclesiology does not conform to hierarchical 
religious practices or to institutionalized communal structures. Martin Luther 
sought to tear down “the ‘walls’ that stood between the believer and the object 
of his beliefs”: the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the final authority of the Pope 
over the interpretation of doctrine.42 Luther sought a return to the primitive 
Church, but “his obsession with religious simplicity caused him to ignore the 
role of religious institutions as political restraints.”43 Even as many churches 
that emerged from the Reformation returned to more formal structures of 
organization, the imprint of Protestant ecclesiology marked the idea of religious 
40. “Faith alone, Scripture alone, grace alone.”
41. “Outside the Church there is no salvation.”
42. Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought, 
revised ed (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) at 136-39.
43. Ibid at 145. 
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liberty that liberalism eventually inherited and developed.44 It is not express 
antipathy to the institutional aspect of religion that pervades the individualist 
understanding of religious freedom but rather disbelief that the corporate aspect 
might be central—not only incidental or instrumental—to religious belief and 
practice. Charles Taylor observed this of William James, who “has trouble getting 
beyond a certain individualism.”45 Taylor notes that: 
Churches are necessary, he clearly concedes. … What doesn’t figure here is the way 
what one might call the religious connection, the link between the believer and the 
divine (or whatever), may be essentially mediated by corporate, ecclesial life. … 
Then the locus of the relation with God is (also) through the community, and not 
simply in the individual. But this is the way that the life of the Christian church 
has been conceived, among many Protestants as well as Catholics; and also the way 
Israel and the Islamic umma have been conceived. Moreover, this is far from being a 
thing of the past; this is still the way in which many today understand their religious 
life.46 
This is not, however, how many academics understand religious life. Even 
those who take religion seriously and try to justify the protections afforded to 
it by the constitutional structure seem to understand religious experience as a 
kind of self-directed research program and the protection of freedom of religion 
as a kind of “academic freedom of the soul.” Autonomy is the central value 
and seems to be at odds with authority: “The moral condition demands that 
we acknowledge responsibility and achieve autonomy wherever and whenever 
possible.”47 A conception of freedom of religion that emphasizes only individual 
autonomy disregards the place of authority in religious discourse.
Perry Dane captures this deficiency by reorienting the justification of 
religious freedom around the concept of authority.48 Authority is indeed central 
to religion in a way that it is not to conscience. When religious believers, even 
solitary seekers, make claims for religious exemption, they likely will not say that 
the general rule from which they seek exemption interfered with their search 
for ultimate meaning in life. Rather, they will argue that their religious beliefs 
44. Because of the lack of a sacerdotal role for Lutheran bishops, Lutheranism is still classified 
as congregational by some scholars, even though Lutheranism came to embrace a form of 
episcopacy, especially in Europe. 
45. Supra note 37 at 23.
46. Ibid at 23-24.
47. Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (Oakland, Cal: University of California 
Press, 1988) at 17.
48. See e.g. “‘Omalous’ Autonomy” (2004) 2004:5 BYUL Rev 1715 [Dane, “‘Omalous’ 
Autonomy”]; Perry Dane, “Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model 
of Competing Authorities” (1980) 90:2 Yale LJ 350.
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compels them to abide by the directives of an authority—whether directly divine 
or mediated through temporal intermediaries—to which they have submitted. 
Submission to this authority is not incidental to religious faith but integral to 
it. Thus, for governments to reduce the role of religion to that of a system of 
belief, or even that of belief combined with a narrow range of actions, would be 
to ignore the behavioural, authoritative, and transcendent elements of religion. 
Such a course would not merely disadvantage a few sects or individuals but would 
be a profoundly secularizing act.49 By contrast, Dane suggests that: 
In the context of adjudicating exemption claims, religion would be defined as a 
system of belief, not necessarily theistic or institutional, that contained a source 
of authority perceived to transcend both the believer and the state. This source of 
authority must be external to personal belief or philosophy, no matter how strong or 
sincere, and must have a reality and normative force analogous to that of a foreign 
government.50
Dane’s approach is remarkably similar to the one suggested by Daniel 
Weinstock in the Canadian context. Weinstock argues that the exclusive emphasis 
on subjective belief that has been adopted as a standard by Canadian courts fails 
to distinguish properly religious claims from claims of conscience. “[T]o the 
extent that constitutional documents and common philosophical and legal usage 
distinguish between freedom of religion and freedom of conscience,” he urges, 
“we must find ways to distinguish the moral considerations that underpin them, 
rather than running them together.”51 To avoid this elision, he observes that 
“[a]ll religions provide their members with what might be termed ‘authoritative 
scripts’. That is, they identify certain texts, obligations, beliefs, rites and practices 
as constitutive of what the tradition is.”52 Persons seeking protection of their 
religious freedom, as opposed to their freedom of conscience (which deserves 
protection under a different category), must make their claims by reference to 
49. Ibid at 364.
50. Ibid at 370.
51.  Daniel Weinstock, “Beyond Objective and Subjective: Assessing the Legitimacy of 
Religious Claims to Accommodation” (2011) 6:2 Ethics F 155 at 172 [Weinstock, “Beyond 
Objective”]. Weinstock also recognizes the subjective standard, which runs conscience and 
religion together, as overly Protestant: “The subjective conception in collapsing religious 
belief onto conscientious conviction tacitly reduces all religion to what we might call a 
‘Protestant’ conception of religion, which privileges the moment of belief over that of 
practice and deference to tradition” (ibid at 167).
52. Ibid at 171.
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the “range of texts, practices, rites … that are at least partially constitutive of a 
religion, and a claim has to be made at least partly by reference to these … .”53
How might an account of religion as an authoritative system support the 
institutionalist account of religious freedom? If all religious traditions have 
“authoritative scripts,” nearly all of them also have interpreters of those scripts—
religious officials of various sorts. Their role, scope, and authoritativeness vary 
from one tradition to another, from the congregational minister who is merely 
a spiritual guide to the Roman Catholic Magisterium whose teachings require 
the full assent of faith. Nevertheless, even in congregational denominations 
like the American Lutherans in Hosanna-Tabor,54 these interpreters and officials 
play a distinct religious role that is not always reducible to belief. Likewise, the 
procedures of church assemblies and tribunals are independent of the beliefs of 
practitioners in important ways. As Dane observes:
The right to institutional autonomy does not depend, as the right to religion-based 
exemptions does, on asserting a specific conflict between a secular legal norm and 
a sincerely held religious belief. To the contrary, the right to autonomy, correctly 
understood, attaches to a religious institution regardless of its motives and beliefs.55
The model of competing authorities that Dane proposes does not 
predetermine the form such authority will take. But it does distinguish religion, 
which points to an external basis of authority, from conscience, which considers 
reasons directly. Dane’s model is equally applicable to more or less formalized 
institutional religious practices, and it does not suggest that religious authority 
is always hierarchical or excludes the participation of the subject. The Roman 
Catholic Pope claiming infallibility when speaking ex cathedra and defining 
doctrine for the entire Catholic Church is, in this sense, the same kind of authority 
as a Baptist Church assembly that decides on all ecclesiastical and theological 
matters democratically. As a historical matter, however, the external basis of 
53. Ibid at 172.
54. Supra note 1 at 3 (affirming the “ministerial exemption,” a bar to employment discrimination 
suits by ordained ministers against their church). The closest Canadian parallel to 
Hosanna-Tabor is an Ontario Superior Court case where a religious organization was found 
liable for employment discrimination against a lesbian employee. See Ontario Human 
Rights Commission v Christian Horizons, 2010 ONSC 2105 at para 106, 102 OR (3d) 267 
[Christian Horizons]. The decision acknowledged that, as a religious organization, Christian 
Horizons was entitled to the statutory exemption but that not participating in same-sex 
relationships was not a bona fide condition of employment. The employee in question was 
not a minister, however, and the statutory context of the case makes it significantly different 
from Hosanna-Tabor.
55. “‘Omalous’ Autonomy,” supra note 48 at 1734.
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authority often has been incarnated in formal institutions and has not merely 
pointed to an incorporeal divine. This is no accident. Freedom of religion requires 
the protection of religious institutions since “[t]he freedom of religion is not only 
lived and experienced through institutions, it is also protected, nourished, and 
facilitated by them.”56 In particular, the Western legal tradition—defined as it 
is by the periodic confrontation between secular and ecclesiastical power—has 
underscored the idea of “freedom of the church” as a distinct and intrinsic aspect 
of religious freedom. 
III. RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
It should be clear by now that the concept of religious freedom in the West is 
not a theoretical construct, but the outcome of concrete historical development. 
We contend that this history contains an irreducibly institutional aspect, which 
is inextricably bound to the meaning of the concept of religious freedom as it has 
been inscribed in modern constitutional and statutory documents. Tracing this 
history is relevant to Canadian jurists because the concept of religious freedom 
recognized in the Constitution Act, 1867 and Constitution Act, 1982 is not merely 
an abstract proposition but the result of historical development—in the Western 
legal tradition in general and the English legal tradition in particular. It is important 
to recognize that this history includes an institutional dimension as well as (and 
sometimes in tension with) an individualist one. This fact helps make sense of the 
latitude given to churches and other religious authorities in liberal-democratic 
states, including Canada, even following widespread secularization. It can also 
reframe difficult debates in Canadian constitutional law or correct an excessive 
individualist interpretation of the Charter.57
The historical element of religious institutionalism is sometimes referred to 
as libertas ecclesiae, “the freedom of the church,” an idea ultimately traced to 
the conflict between secular and religious authority that arose at the end of the 
Roman Empire and re-emerged in the twelfth century. It was the first statement 
56. Richard W Garnett, “‘The Freedom of the Church’: (Towards) An Exposition, Translation, 
and Defense” (2013) 21 J Contemp Legal Issues 33 at 41. For a forceful development 
of the structural argument for religious institutionalism, see Horwitz, First Amendment, 
supra note 18. 
57. See generally, Richard W Garnett, “Religious Liberty, Church Autonomy, and the Structure 
of Freedom” in John Witte Jr & Frank S Alexander, eds, Christianity and Human Rights: An 
Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 267 at 282. 
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of religious freedom in the West and the firmest assertion of the autonomy of 
religious bodies. As such, it is an integral part of the Western concept of religious 
liberty. In one of the first important expressions of libertas ecclesiae, the Emperor 
Constantius sought to pressure and persecute bishops to bring them in line with 
the theological position that he favoured. “Let my will be like canon among you,” 
he proclaimed, to which Hosius, bishop of Cordova, forcefully responded, “Do 
not interfere in matters ecclesiastical, nor give us orders on such questions, but 
learn about them from us. For into your hands God has put the kingdom; the 
affairs of his Church he has committed to us … . We are not permitted to exercise 
an earthly rule; and you, Sire, are not authorized to burn incense.”58 A century 
later, Pope Gelasius I replied in the same way to Emperor Anastasius, who had 
attempted to rearrange the hierarchical order of bishops in the Church.59 Gelasius 
asserted a distinction between two sources of authority that guaranteed autonomy 
for the religious body: “Two [elements] there are indeed … by which this world 
is principally ruled: the consecrated authority of the priests and the royal power,” 
and he called on each to defer to the other in matters of its own competence.60
The conflict between temporal and ecclesiastical authorities intensified 
after the fall of the Empire in the West and came to a head six centuries later. 
The late-medieval world was by then characterized by many overlapping 
jurisdictions, of which those of the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor were 
the most prominent. Both jurisdictions clashed in the Investiture Conflict, when 
Pope Gregory VII raised the doctrine of libertas ecclesiae against Holy Roman 
Emperor Henry IV.61 At the heart of the controversy was the Pope’s assertion of 
supreme authority to appoint bishops, a supremacy that the Emperor contested. 
The conflict was resolved through the Concordat of Worms in 1122 CE, which 
recognized, as a constitutive element of the political order, the existence of the 
Church as an autonomous authority.62 Harold Berman and others have called the 
principle of libertas ecclesiae one of the foundations of Western constitutionalism 
58. Henry Bettenson & Chris Maunder, Documents of the Christian Church, 4th ed (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011) at 20-21.
59. HA Drake, “The Church, Society and Political Power” in Augustine Casiday & Frederick 
W Norris, eds, Cambridge History of Christianity, vol 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) 403 at 415.
60. Pope Gelasius I, “Letter to the Emperor Anastasius” in Karl F Morrison et al, eds, University 
of Chicago Readings in Western Civilization: The Church in the Roman Empire, vol 3 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986) 112 at 112.
61. Brian Tierney, “Religion and Rights: A Medieval Perspective” (1987) 5:1 JL & 
Religion 163 at 167.
62. Ernest F Henderson, Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages (London: George Bell & 
Sons, 1892) at 408-409.
(2015) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL1068
and limited government, as it established external limits to the authority of the 
emerging state.63 
The idea of libertas ecclesiae was also central to the development of limited 
government in England, where a parallel struggle unfolded in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries. In 1164 CE, King Henry II attempted to submit English 
clerics, and especially ecclesiastical courts, to the authority of the crown by 
“provid[ing] for appeals from the archbishop’s courts to the court of the king,” a 
procedure contrary to canon law.64 The King was vigorously opposed by Thomas 
Becket, the Archbishop of Canterbury, whose martyrdom forced Henry’s 
retreat.65 Two kings and half a century later, the freedom of the English Church 
was asserted again in the first article of Magna Carta, which “confirmed, for 
Us and our Heirs for ever, that the Church of England shall be free, and shall 
have all her whole Rights and Liberties inviolable.”66 The Magna Carta was, of 
course, especially relevant to the development of institutional religious freedom 
in Canada: Its first article has never been repealed, and thus it forms part of the 
received law before Confederation (although, as an ordinary English statute and 
not part of the Constitution, its current legal force is doubtful).
The Protestant Reformation and Catholic Counter-Reformation accelerated 
the consolidation of authority in the modern nation-state, but the tension 
between ecclesiastical and secular authority persisted.67 Henry VIII broke with 
Rome not because of differences of doctrine, but over who should control 
ecclesiastical institutions.68 James VI of England and James I of Scotland struggled 
to subjugate both the English Church and Presbyterian Church governance in 
63. Harold J Berman, Law and Revolution (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983) 
at 103-106.    
64. Ibid at 257. As Berman observes:
Historians of English law have analyzed the titanic conflict between Henry and Becket largely 
in terms of their respective positions in regard to article 3 [which restricted the benefit of 
clergy]. In fact, however, other provisions of the constitutions were more significant. Article 8 
would have made the king, rather than the pope, the supreme arbiter of canon law in England.
65. John Hudson, The Oxford History of the Laws of England vol II: 871-1216 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012) at 769.
66. Magna Carta, 1297 (UK), 25 Edw 1, c 29, s 1. For various interpretations of the Magna 
Carta, see Tierney, supra note 61 at 172-74.
67. Harold J Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on 
the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2003) at 57; Diarmaid 
MacCulloch, Reformation: Europe’s House Divided, 1490-1700 (New York: Penguin Books, 
2003) at 668-79.
68. Erwin Fahlbusch et al, eds, The Encyclopedia of Christianity, vol 5 by Geoffrey W Bromiley 
(Grand Rapids, Mich: Wm B Eerdmans, 2008) at 614.
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Scotland.69 None of these disputes were primarily concerned with the faith of 
subjects—often the English monarchs made substantial accommodations to 
belief and practice—but rather with the claims of ecclesiastical institutions to 
independence from the Crown. 
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries finally saw the gradual emancipation 
of religious minorities in Britain—Protestant dissenters, Roman Catholics, 
Jews—on the basis of toleration of individual belief, but this proved insufficient 
to accommodate actual religious practice.70 The freedom of the church remained 
a live controversy and extended even into the established churches in both 
England and Scotland.71 One of the clearest voices raised in defence of religious 
institutions was that of John Neville Figgis, an Anglican clergyman and historian 
who took up the defence of the Scottish Kirk—the state-sponsored Presbyterian 
Church of Scotland—as that body sought to remain free of private patronage 
and direct state control.72 Figgis argued that churches were not the creation of the 
state. In his view, state intervention in the development of church governance and 
doctrine was a violence done to the association itself and to the institutions that 
structured the common life of its members: “The point of issue is not whether 
Churches can do anything they choose, but whether human law is to regard them 
as having inherent powers, rights, and wills of their own … which are inherent 
and not concessionary.”73 In the same period, the celebrated historian Lord Acton 
69. Ibid at 614-15.
70. Ian Machin, “British Catholics” in Rainer Liedtke & Stephan Wendehorst, The Emancipation 
of Catholics, Jews and Protestants: Minorities and the Nation State in Nineteenth-Century Europe 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999) 11; David Cesarani, “British Jews” in 
Rainer Liedtke & Stephan Wendehorst, The Emancipation of Catholics, Jews and Protestants: 
Minorities and the Nation State in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1999) 33.
71. Fahlbusch et al, supra note 68.
72. The so-called Free Kirk case is Bannantyne v Overtoun. See Bannantyne v Overtoun 
(1904), [1904] AC 515 (HL (Scot)). Its effect was felt early on in Canada, and the Supreme 
Court of Canada cited it as an authority as early as 1906. See Polushie v Zacklynski, [1906] 
37 SCR 177, (1906) TLR 152. See also Dobie, supra note 6 (presenting a similar dispute 
regarding the allocation of assets and government emoluments of the Presbyterian Church 
after Confederation, which the Privy Council decided primarily on the provincial authority 
to amend or repeal pre-Confederation statutes). More recently, the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal has found occasion to discuss the Free Kirk case at length, in the context of 
property disputes in the Anglican Church. See Bentley v Anglican Synod of the Diocese of New 
Westminster, 2010 BCCA 506, 62 ETR (3d) 1, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 34045 (16 
June 2011) [Bentley]; Rand v The Anglican Synod of the Diocese of British Columbia, 2008 
BCCA 294, 84 BCLR (4th) 124.
73. John N Figgis, Churches in the Modern State (London: Longman’s Green & Co, 
1913) at 251-52.
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(whose works Figgis edited) echoed these concerns from a Catholic perspective, 
denouncing the view that individual religious liberty can exist where “religious 
profession is free, but Church government is controlled.” On the contrary, 
he claimed that “where ecclesiastical authority is restricted, religious liberty is 
virtually denied.”74 
As Figgis and Acton were aware, across the English Channel, the Third French 
Republic had suppressed all religious orders, allowed only religious associations 
controlled by laypersons,75 closed all religious schools,76 and confiscated church 
property,77 which together made it impossible for the Roman Catholic Church to 
assume a civil form consonant with canon law. The Republic took these actions 
on the principle that “[t]here is no authority but the authority of the Republic.”78 
Led on, in part, by the Papal indictment that “nothing more hostile to the liberty 
of the Church than this Law could well be conceived,”79 many parishioners 
ignored the associative structures provided by state law and continued to defer 
to their bishops, as canon law required of them. After twenty years of acrimony, 
the state relented on the question of lay control of religious corporations.80 As 
Figgis noted in retrospect, “the persecution was not of religious convictions or 
practices as such, but of all associations to develop religion in a communal life, 
on the ground, nominally, that such unions were inimical to the omnipotence 
of the State.”81 The violation of religious liberty that occurred here cannot be 
74. John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton, “The Protestant Theory of Persecution” in John 
Neville Figgis and Reginald Vere Laurence, eds, The History of Freedom and Other Essays 
(London: Macmillan, 1906) 130 at 151.
75. Loi du 1er juillet 1901 relative au contrat d’association, JO, 1 July 1901, 4025 [Loi 
des associations].
76. Loi du 7 juillet 1904 interdisant l’enseignement aux congrégations religieuses, 5 July 1904, as 
repealed by Loi du 3 septembre 1940 abrogeant la loi du 7 juillet 1904 et l’article 14 de la loi du 
1er juillet 1901, JO, 3 September 1940, 4489-90 [Loi des congrégations].
77. Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Eglises et de l’Etat, JO, 11 December 
1905, 7205 [Loi de separation].
78. Figgis, supra note 73 at 181, citing Emile Combes, former seminarian and architect of the 
Loi des congrégations and the Loi de separation. See Guy Laperrière, Les congrégations religious 
De la France au Québec, 1880-1940, t 2 (Sainte-Foy, Que: Presses de l’Université Laval, 
1999) at 55, 569-72. 
79. Pope Pius X, “Vehementer Nos” (11 February 1906) at para 9, online: Libreria Editrice 
Vaticana <w2.vatican.va/content/pius-x/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-x_enc_11021906_
vehementer-nos.pdf> [emphasis added].
80. Pope Pius XI, “Maximam gravissimamque” (18 January 1924), online: Libreria Editrice 
Vaticana <w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_18011924_
maximam-gravissimamque.pdf> (approving proposed state statutes).
81. Figgis, supra note 73 at 24-25.
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properly explained in individualist terms—it was on individualist terms, in fact, 
that suppression of the church was justified. It only made sense as a threat to 
institutional religious freedom, to the integrity of the Church as an institution.
Across the ocean, the evidence for religious institutionalism was mixed, 
and this was reflected in both private and public law over the following century. 
Early on, republican sympathies in the United States worked to undermine 
the independence of religious institutions that did not conform to democratic 
principles, especially (and recurrently) the Roman Catholic Church.82 But 
soon divisions within churches led to internecine disputes within religious 
institutions, and courts had to decide whether and how to recognize institutional 
religious authority in these congregations. From the start, the US Supreme 
Court refused to rely on substantive tests of religious doctrine, setting aside 
English precedent that allowed courts to favour doctrinal continuity in settling 
disputes among congregants.83 Instead, the court decided to frame questions 
of authority in terms of ecclesiastical polity, generally deferring to the central 
authorities of religious organizations, especially of churches with highly formal 
administrative and judicial structures. Following this line of cases, courts hesitated 
when passing judgment on the determinations of ecclesiastical tribunals84 or 
questioning ecclesiastical decisions when they bore on questions of religious 
faith or discipline.85 They refused even to inquire into the alleged arbitrariness 
of a church’s decision to remove a bishop from office.86 Such deference helped 
churches preserve a significant degree of autonomy but also caused problems in 
82. One of the earliest examples of this is the trusteeism controversy, which arose in several 
dioceses of the Roman Catholic Church in the 1820s. See PW Carey, People, Priests, and 
Prelates (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987). While academic focus on 
trusteeism has been on the Baltimore diocese, the controversy spread across the United 
States and was even felt in Canada. See Terrence Murphy, “Trusteeism in Atlantic Canada: 
The Struggle for Leadership among the Irish Catholics of Halifax, St. John’s, and Saint 
John, 1780-1850” in Terrence Murphy and Gerald Stortz, eds, Creed and Culture: The Place 
of English-Speaking Catholics in Canadian Society, 1750-1930 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1993) 126.
83. Watson v Jones, 80 US 679 (1872) [Watson]. Watson was reaffirmed a century later. See 
Presbyterian Church v Hull Church, 393 US 440 (1969).
84. Gonzalez v Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 US 1 (1929). 
85. Kedroff v St Nicholas Cathedral, 344 US 94 (1952).
86. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v Milivojevich, 426 US 696 at 709 (1976). This case was 
recently cited approvingly by the Supreme Court of Canada. See Mounted Police Association 
of Ontario v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 1 at para 64, [2015] 1 SCR 3.
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doctrine and adjudication.87 Subsequent jurisprudence allowed lower courts to 
resolve disputes involving religious organizations solely on the basis of “neutral 
principles of law,” but nonetheless required them to “defer to the resolution of 
the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body.”88 Beyond ecclesiastical 
disputes—and relevant to present controversies in Canada—the US Court 
responded to an increasingly pluralistic religious landscape by retrenching 
protections for religious autonomy, recognizing a fundamental right to private 
religious schooling,89 and accepting as constitutional the exemption of churches 
from general anti-discrimination legislation.90 Over the course of more than a 
century marked by increasing religious pluralism, some practices were deemed 
beyond the pale, from polygamy in the nineteenth century91 to the ritual ingestion 
of hallucinogens in the twentieth.92 But over the last two decades, institutional 
religious exemptions have expanded through both federal and state legislation.93
Recent US Court jurisprudence suggests renewed deference to the 
internal authorities and procedures of religious organizations and renewed 
accommodation of a separate sphere of authority exempt from some general laws, 
culminating in Hosanna-Tabor.94 The decision is remarkable because it goes to 
great lengths to place the autonomy of religious institutions in a broader Western 
historical setting, referencing the Magna Carta and the Investitures Controversy. 
It is also remarkable because it treats religious groups as direct bearers of religious 
freedom, making repeated reference to “the church,” not to parishioners or 
church leaders, and proscribing interference “with the internal governance of 
the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will 
87. Greenawalt discusses the problems of the hierarchal deference or “polity” approach. See Kent 
Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Vol I: Free Exercise and Fairness (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2009) at 286-89.
88. Jones v Wolf, 443 US 595 at 604 (1979). For the application of the standard by lower courts, 
see Hassler, supra note 22; Ellis, supra note 22. 
89. Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 at 519 (1925).
90. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v Amos, 483 
US 327 at 15-16 (1987).
91. Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145 at 61 (1878).
92. Employment Division v Smith, 494 US 872 (1990).
93. See e.g. Restoration Act, supra note 2; Land Use Act, supra note 2.
94. Supra note 1. On church autonomy generally, see Kedroff v Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 
US 94 (1952); Kreshik v Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 US 190 (1960); Serbian Orthodox 
Diocese v Milivojevich, 426 US 696 (1976). On exemptions from discrimination statutes, see 
Corporatio of Presiding Bishop v Amos, 483 US 327 (1987).
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personify its beliefs.”95 Several scholars see Hosanna-Tabor as continuous with an 
institutional turn,96 reflected in disputes as varied as the control of property in 
cases of schism97 and the regulation of businesses whose owners are religiously 
devout.98 There is every reason to think that these recent American cases bear 
on the minds of the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada and of lower 
court judges. Regarding internal church disputes (which have remained largely 
confined to the provincial courts of appeal), judges have struggled to reconcile the 
influence of American standards of neutrality and separation with the Canadian 
constitutional context. In property disputes within the Anglican Church, courts 
have been generally deferential to church hierarchy and institutional autonomy;99 
in labour disputes between religious employees, the evidence is mixed, but it is 
still too early to tell.100 On broader constitutional terms, Burwell v Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc controversially expanded the range of corporate entities—especially 
business corporations—able to claim the protection of religious liberty in the 
United States.101 The issue was before the Supreme Court of Canada in Loyola102 
95. Hosanna-Tabor, supra note 1 at 13 [emphasis added]. The closing line reiterates the 
ontological point: “The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way” 
(ibid at 22). There is some controversy about the nature of state restraint in this case. The US 
Supreme Court explicitly refuses to treat the ministerial exception as a jurisdictional bar to 
intervention in church disputes, but the majority is extremely deferential to a church’s own 
classification of ministers. As Thomas J observes in his concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor, “[T]
he Religion Clauses require civil courts to apply the ministerial exception and to defer to a 
religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister” (ibid at 1). 
96. Horwitz, First Amendment, supra note 18 at 187-89; Ashutosh Bhagwat, “Religious 
Associations: Hosanna-Tabor and the Instrumental Value of Religious Groups” (2014) 92:1 
Wash U L Rev 73 at 108-109.
97. Episcopal Church Cases, 87 Cal Rptr 3d 275 (2009).
98. Burwell, supra note 1. 
99. See e.g. Delicata et al v Incorporated Synod of the Diocese of Huron, 2013 ONCA 540 at 69-72, 
117 OR (3d) 1 [Delicata], leave to appeal to SCC refused, 35601 (March 4, 2014); Bentley, 
supra note 73 at 73-76. Both cases involved Anglican parishes that sought to disaffiliate 
themselves from their diocese over doctrinal differences, arguing a departure by the hierarchy 
from the original purpose of the religious trust. The Court of Appeal in each case effectively 
deferred to the hierarchy as to the interpretation of the religious purpose and ruled out 
unilateral disaffiliation.
100. Christian Horizons, supra note 54. See also Kong v Vancouver Chinese Baptist Church, 2014 
BCSC 1424 at paras 49-51, 243 ACWS (3d) 883 [Kong]. The BCSC asserted jurisdiction 
over a wrongful dismissal suit by Senior Pastor of a church, deeming employment of clergy 
to be equivalent to any other employment barring explicit clauses subjecting the parties to 
internal church law.
101. Burwell, supra note 1. 
102. Supra note 9.
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and will certainly arise again in the upcoming TWU Law School controversy, as 
we discuss in Part V(F), below.103 
IV. RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONALISM AND CANADIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
Religious institutionalism, we have explained, holds that formal religious 
institutions have independent claims to religious liberty irreducible to the 
protection of individual freedom of religion, making it necessary for courts to 
recognize and give effect to these distinct dimensions of religious freedom. This 
position is defensible philosophically and persists throughout the history of 
religious liberty. Yet despite the continuing importance of religion to Canadian 
constitutional development, the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence is 
ambiguous about the constitutional protection of the institutional dimensions 
of religion. Privileging an individualized notion of religious freedom centered on 
subjective conscience and belief, the Court has incrementally shifted away from 
older case law that recognized the broader institutional and collective dimensions 
of religion.104 Indeed, this individualistic frame has set the boundaries of analysis 
in religious freedom litigation and, until very recently, limited the range of 
possible successful arguments.105 As noted by Faisal Bhabha, “the Supreme Court 
appears to have embraced a definition of religious freedom that has internal 
conceptual limits which constrain the kinds of claims that will be covered by 
section 2(a).”106 One such internal conceptual limit is the Court’s failure to engage 
meaningfully with religious freedom’s institutional dimensions and to afford it its 
own distinct purpose and function under section 2(a) of the Charter. The overall 
result is a denatured, decontextualized, and impoverished rendering of religion 
103. For further cases on this matter, see infra notes 284-85.
104. See Faisal Bhabha, “From Saumur to L.(S.): Tracing the Theory and Concept of Religious 
Freedom under Canadian Law” (2012) 58 Sup Ct L Rev (2nd) 109 at 112. Bhabha similarly 
observes that “the protection of religion within Canadian constitutional jurisprudence has, 
from its inception, included a dual recognition of both the group and individual bases of 
religious practice and identity” (ibid at 114).
105. Howard Kislowicz, “Faithful Translations?: Cross-Cultural Communication in Canadian 
Religious Freedom Litigation” (2014) 52:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 141 at 156-57. As we discuss in 
Part V(F), below, the Loyola case may indicate a turn. 
106. Supra note 104 at 112.
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in Canadian constitutional culture that limits the ways in which the Court may 
address emerging disputes concerning religious organizations.107
A discussion on the origins of the constitutional protection of religious 
freedom in Canada must inevitably begin with an overview of colonial history. 
Canada’s religious heritage developed to ensure the coexistence and protection 
of its Protestant and Roman Catholic inhabitants, reflecting the country’s roots 
in the French and British empires. Indeed, even prior to Confederation, the 
protection of religious freedom was central in maintaining social peace and 
national cohesion.108 The Articles of Capitulation of 1760,109 the Treaty of Paris,110 
the Royal Proclamation, 1763,111 and the Quebec Act of 1774112 all contain special 
provisions protecting against restrictions on the exercise of religion.113 The Quebec 
Act of 1774 is perhaps the most important of these foundational documents. As 
a socio-political instrument enacted by the Parliament of Westminster to secure 
the French population’s neutrality in conflicts with the Thirteen Colonies,114 
the Québec Act contained specific provisions securing the institutional status of 
the Roman Catholic Church, which had enjoyed limited protection under the 
common law. For instance, section 5 declared and enshrined the free exercise 
of Roman Catholicism in the province of Quebec, subject only to “the King’s 
supremacy.”115 In turn, this protection was maintained in several additional 
documents. This was not quite a blanket approval of religious institutionalism, 
but it did constitute the recognition that some religious practice was intrinsically 
tied to concrete authoritative institutions. To that effect, section 42 of 
the Constitution Act, 1791 provided that any law relating to or affecting “the 
107. For an analysis of Canadian constitutional culture’s conceptualization of religious freedom, 
see Benjamin L Berger, “Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture” (2007) 45:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 
277 [Berger, “Law’s Religion”].
108. See e.g. Benjamin L Berger, “Religious Diversity, Education, and the ‘Crisis’ in State 
Neutrality” (2014) 29:1 CJLS 103 at 104 [Berger, “Religious Diversity”].
109. “Articles of Capitulation,” in A Collection of the Acts Passed in the Parliament of Great 
Britain and of Other Public Acts Relative to Canada (Quebec: PE Desbarats, 1824) 2, arts 
27, 30, 40, 47.
110. Definitive Treaty of Peace Between Great Britain and the United States of America, United 
States, France, Great Britain, and Spain, 10 February 1763, 42 Cons TS 279 [Treaty of Paris].
111. RSC 1985, App II, No 1 [Royal Proclamation]. 
112. An Act for Making More Effectual Provision for the Government of Québec in North America, 
1774, 14 Geo III, c 83 [Quebec Act].
113. This is confirmed by Rand J in R v Robertson and Rosetanni. See R v Robertson and Rosetanni, 
[1963] SCR 651, 41 DLR (2d) 485 [Robertson cited to SCR].
114. Sir Reginald Coupland, The Québec Act: A Study in Statesmanship (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1925) at 208-17.
115. Quebec Act, supra note 112, ss 5, 15.
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enjoyment or exercise of any religious form or mode or worship”116 would only 
take effect upon passage by both Houses of Parliament followed by Royal Assent. 
Section 42 was further carried over in the Act of Union of 1840,117 which established 
the Province of Canada.118 Another key example is the Statute of 1852,119 which 
affirmed “legal equality amongst all Religious Denominations” and declared it 
“an admitted principle of Colonial Legislation” and “a fundamental principle of 
[the Canadian] civil polity.”120
From as early as 1760, then, Canadian constitutional culture distilled the 
concept of religious freedom into two identifiable strains.121 The first grounds 
religious freedom on the “complete liberty of religious thought” in which “the 
conscience of each is a personal matter and the concern of nobody else.”122 This 
is consistent with an individualistic conception of religious freedom. The second 
strain is distinctly institutional. Emphasizing the collective and institutional 
dimensions of religious practice, it conceives religious freedom as extending 
beyond attributes exclusive to the individual rights-bearer. The pre-Confederation 
treatment of religion’s institutional dimensions is best summarized by Justice 
Rand in Robertson, who observed:
[R]eligious freedom has, in our legal system, been recognized as a principle 
of fundamental character; and although we have nothing in the nature of an 
established church … it is unquestionable … that the untrammeled affirmations of 
religious belief and its propagation, personal or institutional, remain as of the greatest 
constitutional significance throughout the Dominion.123
Confederation largely preserved the protection conferred on both individual 
and institutional religious freedom in the colonial era.124 For instance, section 
129 of the British North America Act, 1867 continued all the laws enacted before 
it, subject to each legislature’s prerogative to repeal, abolish, or alter them.125 
This ensured that the existing legal protections of religious freedom remained in 
116. (UK), 31 Geo III, c 31, s 42.
117. British North America Act, 1840, 3-4 Vict, c 35, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 4 
[Act of Union].
118. Ibid.
119. Statute of 1852 of Old Province of Canada (UK), 14 & 15 Vict, c 175 [Statute of 1852].
120. Ibid.
121. Robertson, supra note 113 at 655.
122. Chaput v Romain, [1955] SCR 834 at 840, 1 DLR (2d) 241 [Chaput]. See also Lamb v 
Benoit, [1959] SCR 321 at 323, 17 DLR (2d) 369. 
123. Robertson, supra note 113 at 655 [emphasis added]. 
124. Walter v Attorney General of Alberta, [1969] SCR 383 at 391-92, 3 DLR (3d) 1.
125. (UK) 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 129, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5 
[Constitution Act, 1867].
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force after Confederation. In addition, and as a political compromise of central 
importance,126 section 93 extended protection to Protestant and Roman Catholic 
dissentient schools, whose “Powers, Privileges, and Duties” were to remain 
unaffected by the birth of the Canadian nation-state.127 
Additional jurisprudence demonstrates the Supreme Court of Canada’s respect 
for, and deference to, religious institutions in the post-Confederation era. For 
example, in Ash v Methodist Church,128 the Court declined to exercise jurisdiction 
over an application for mandamus for reinstatement by a plaintiff who had been 
prevented from pursuing his calling as a Minister of the Church. Consistent with 
the “ministerial exception” doctrine, former Chief Justice of Canada Strong held 
that “[t]he question whether a minister is unacceptable or inefficient is peculiarly 
one for the judgment of the Conference.” Correspondingly, courts of law do not 
have the right to interfere in internal religious matters.129 Indeed, the prerogative 
of religious institutions to self-determine, in matters including membership and 
126. See e.g. Berger, “Religious Diversity,” supra note 108 at 104.
127. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 125, s 93. See e.g. Reference re Education Act (Que), 
[1993] 2 SCR 511 at 529, 154 NR 1. However, in 1997, Quebec exercised its unilateral 
constitutional amendment powers under s 45 of the Constitution Act, 1982 to effectively 
render s 93 inapplicable in the province. See Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 125, s 
93A, as amended by Constitution Amendment, 1997 (Quebec), SI/97-141, (1998) C Gaz 
II, 308. However, this amendment should not preclude religious institutions, educational 
or otherwise, from invoking the protection of section 2(a) of the Charter to advance 
institutionalist claims against state interference. The accommodation to religious educational 
institutions was a narrow protection designed to secure equal public funding and preclude 
suppression—creating, in effect, a “quasi-establishment.” See MH Ogilvie, “What is a 
Church by Law Established?” (1990) 28:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 179. But religious establishment 
is wholly separate from (and sometimes contrary to) the broader principle of “freedom of 
the church” as we discuss in Part V, below. See infra note 160. Moreover, on more specific 
constitutional grounds, a province’s unilateral amendment of s 93 cannot be equated with an 
amendment to the Charter, which would require the consent of seven provinces representing 
at least 50 per cent of the Canadian population, as constitutionally required. See Procedure 
for Amending Constitution of Canada, ss 38(1), 42, being Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. Furthermore, a provision of the 
Canadian constitution cannot be read as interfering with rights protected by another. See e.g. 
Adler v Ontario (Attorney General), [1996] 3 SCR 609 at 643-44, 30 OR (3d) 642 [Adler]. 
Thus, the amendment of a constitutional provision should not be understood as amending 
another constitutional provision addressing cognate matters. This is particularly true since 
“[t]he Canadian Charter does not repeal the Constitution Act, 1867 or the constitutional 
compromises it reflects.” See Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la 
jeunesse) v Communauté urbaine de Montréal, 2004 SCC 30 at para 16, [2004] 1 SCR 789.
128. [1901] 31 SCR 497, 22 Occ N 3 [Ash].
129. Ibid at 498.
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ascendancy to higher positions in the church hierarchy, lies at the core of religious 
institutionalism. The decision in Ash unambiguously reflects this principle.
Both pre- and post-Confederation jurisprudence therefore shows that the 
Court was receptive to a dual conception of religious freedom. Religious bodies 
were regarded as major institutions of social control,130 entitled to respect and 
deference from the State in matters solely within their purview. This is consistent 
with the notion of libertas ecclesiae and the state’s recognition of a sovereign 
independent of its own. The tendency seems to have maintained itself following 
the enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights,131 Canada’s first federal instrument 
providing for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms.
Enacted in 1960 by the Parliament of Canada, the Bill of Rights was the first 
step in Canada’s federal human rights protection policy.132 Although the Bill of 
Rights is an ordinary rather than constitutional enactment, and although it only 
applies to matters within federal jurisdiction,133 it provides robust protection to 
religious freedom. Section 1(c) reads: “It is hereby recognized and declared that 
in Canada there have existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination 
by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, namely … [f ]reedom of religion.”134 A plain 
language interpretation of the Bill of Rights reveals section 1 as playing two 
distinct, interlinked functions. First, the Bill of Rights recognizes the continued 
existence of the fundamental freedom of religious liberty without discrimination. 
Second, the Bill of Rights plays a declaratory function, enshrining the conception 
of religious freedom that existed and continued to exist as of the Bill of Rights’s 
enactment. Both guarantees of religious freedom found under section 1(c) mirror 
the protection conferred under the Statute of 1852135 and reiterated in Chaput.136
130. Bhabha observes that individual religious freedom in pre-Confederation Canada “appear[s] 
to be derived from the acknowledgement and affirmation of religion as a legitimate moral 
and institutional player with status and interests.” See Bhabha, supra note 104 at 114.
131. SC 1960, c 44 [Bill of Rights].
132. See generally William A Schabas, International Human Rights Law and The Canadian 
Charter, 2nd ed (Scarborough, Ont: Carswell, 1996) at 6-8. While the Bill of Rights was 
the first federal protection of civil liberties, “[s]ince the latter part of the second world war, 
Canadian provincial Legislatures have been active in promoting egalitarian civil liberties 
by statute.” See Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed (Toronto: Thompson 
Reuters, 2007) ch 34.3(a) at 34-37. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the 
provincial precedent.
133. Bill of Rights, supra note 131, s 5(3).
134. Ibid, s 1(c).
135. Statute of 1852, supra note 119.
136. Chaput, supra note 122.
MUÑIZ-FRATICELLI & DAVID, RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONALISM IN A CANADIAN CONTEXT 1079
An important aspect of section 1 of the Bill of Rights is the distinction between 
fundamental freedoms and human rights. Of the six protections enumerated 
in section 1, the first two are named “human rights,” which are held by “the 
individual.” For example, section 1(a) protects “the right of the individual to life, 
liberty … [and] security of the person.”137 The next four are called “freedoms” 
and are listed without reference to the nature of the rights-holder. One way 
of understanding the distinction is that fundamental freedoms extend beyond 
individual human beings and may protect collective or corporate persons directly, 
while human rights attach only to natural persons. To be sure, the Bill of Rights 
categorizes religious freedom as a “fundamental freedom,” without particular 
reference as to the natural or legal persons that may invoke the guarantee. The 
fact that these individual rights are associated with the human person would 
suggest that the “freedoms” are not so limited. The same was at least recognized 
in Robertson,138 the first case to examine religious freedom under the Bill of Rights. 
Specifying the scope, extent, and effect of section 1(c), Justice Ritchie noted that:
The Canadian Bill of Rights was not concerned with “human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” in any abstract sense, but rather with such “rights and freedoms” as they 
existed in Canada immediately before the statute was enacted … . It is therefore 
the “religious freedom” then existing that is safe-guarded by the [Bill of Rights’s] 
provisions.139
Importantly, Justice Ritchie outlined an explicitly dualistic conception of 
religious freedom existing at, and continuing to exist as of, the enactment of 
the Bill of Rights. Emphasizing the importance of understanding this concept 
as it was recognized before the Bill of Rights, Justice Ritchie first highlighted the 
individual dimensions of religious freedom. Yet, Justice Ritchie also accepted that 
“‘religious belief ’ and its propagation, personal or institutional,” as they existed 
from the British Conquest onwards, remained “of the greatest constitutional 
significance.”140
Judicial reluctance to interfere in internal church disputes—as prominently 
exemplified in Ash—also continued in the post-Bill of Rights era. For example, 
in Hofer v Hofer and Interlake Colony of Hutterian Brethren, the Court rejected 
137. Bill of Rights, supra note 131, s 1(a).
138. Robertson, supra note 113. Analytically, the distinction seems arbitrary, as some rights, such 
as the right to the enjoyment of property, can attach to legal persons such as corporations. 
Therefore, it may be taken merely as a hypothesis about the contemporary historical meaning 
of the Bill of Rights. 
139. Ibid at 654.
140. Ibid at 655 [emphasis added], citing Saumur v City of Quebec, [1953] 2 SCR 299 at 327, 106 
CCC 289 [Saumur].
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an action for declaratory judgment brought by excommunicated members of 
the Lakeside Colony of Hutterian Brethren.141 In a six-to-one decision, the 
Court declined to intervene in matters of internal Church membership and 
refused to order the distribution of the Colony’s assets to the plaintiffs and 
community members. The overall result, expressed in Justice Richie’s majority 
opinion, is an unmistakable nod to religious institutionalism.142 The fact that the 
case was not brought under the Bill of Rights does not disrupt this conclusion. 
If anything, decisions such as Interlake demonstrate that the protection of religious 
institutionalism can take various forms, whether constitutional, legislative, or by 
virtue of judicial policy. Taking these developments in their totality, the dualistic 
strain of religious freedom clearly continued to exist following the Bill of Right’s 
enactment. In fact, the Bill of Rights’s endorsement of this dualistic conception 
makes it difficult to comprehend the shift to a purely individualistic conception 
of religious freedom that followed the enactment of the Charter.143
V. RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONALISM IN THE POST-CHARTER 
ERA
The enactment of the Charter in 1982 inaugurated a new period in the protection 
of religious freedom in Canada. Section 2(a) declares that everyone has the 
fundamental freedom that is “freedom of conscience and religion.”144 Expressed 
in such broad and general terms, the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom 
under section 2(a) has been decisively shaped by the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
understanding of the Charter as a constitutional instrument and of freedom of 
religion as a historical and conceptual category. 
141. [1970] SCR 958, 13 DLR (3d) 1 [Interlake cited to SCR]. 
142. There was, to be sure, disagreement over the nature of the colony. Richie J, writing for 
the majority, did not distinguish between the church and the colony, as the latter, while a 
business with a separate legal existence, was animated by the same religious principles. See 
Interlake, ibid at 968-69). Cartwright J and Spence J did not take the Hutterite church’s 
self-understanding as determinative and saw the controversy over the colony’s assets as a 
contractual dispute (ibid at 961-63).
143. In a post-Charter decision, the Court followed the majority in Interlake in acknowledging the 
Church’s internal legal authority—extending to its tradition as source of law—all the while 
demanding that it adhere to principles of natural justice, such as notice and process. See 
Hutterite Brethren of Lakeside Colony v Hofer, [1992] 3 SCR 165, 97 DLR (4th) 17. For a full 
discussion of the history of Hutterite disputes, see Alvin J Esau, The Courts and the Colonies: 
The Litigation of Hutterite Church Disputes (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 2004) at 1-12.
144. Charter, supra note 5, s 2(a).
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A. BIG M AND THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF RELIGION
The process began with the landmark case of Big M Drug Mart,145 which set the 
tone for later jurisprudence. The facts of Big M are well known: The owners of the 
namesake grocery store had been accused of selling merchandise on Sunday in 
violation of the Lord’s Day Act. The Lord’s Day Act had previously been found to 
be constitutional in the Robertson case, but that decision dated to a legal regime 
governed by the Bill of Rights. By the time the Big M case made its way to the 
Court, the Charter had been enacted. The Court, reversing its prior decision 
in Robertson, declared the Lord’s Day Act in violation of the Charter and thus 
unconstitutional. This legal change reflected broader changes in Canadian society, 
especially simultaneous tendencies towards secularization and greater religious 
pluralism, which had important consequences in the Court’s approach. 
The Court in Big M understood the Charter as a constitutional break. 
Interpretation of rights and freedoms under the Bill of Rights was not determinative 
in interpreting their Charter homologues. For Chief Justice Dickson, the crucial 
variable was the imperative nature of the language used in the Charter: Whereas 
the Bill of Rights’s language purports to “simply ‘recognize and declare’” rights 
existing at the time of its enactment, the Charter proclaims that everyone has the 
rights and freedoms it guarantees.146 This limits the utility of citing pre-Charter 
jurisprudence.147 Particularly, Chief Justice Dickson singled out Robertson as being 
of no application in the post-Charter era. The definition of religious freedom 
spelled out in that case, which recognized both individual and institutional 
dimensions,148 was said to be particular to the Bill of Rights. However, even if 
the Bill of Rights only recognized existing rights, while the Charter declares a 
new rights regime, it does not follow that the Charter abrogates rights already 
recognized under the previous instrument.149 The usual reading of Big M is that 
in cases where a right is protected under the Bill of Rights and the Charter, the 
latter supersedes the interpretation of the right under the former; Charter rights 
are generally broader and thus “the cautious, restrictive interpretations of the Bill 
of Rights are more likely to be repudiated in favour of a generous interpretation 
145. Supra note 7.
146. Ibid at para 115.
147. Ibid.
148. Robertson, supra note 113; Saumur, supra note 140.
149. This is recognized explicitly for the provisions of the Bill of Rights that are not themselves 
contained in the Charter, namely the protection of due process (and through it, property 
rights) in section 1(a) and the guarantee of a fair hearing for the determination of rights and 
obligations in section 2(e). See Hogg, supra note 132, ch 35.1, 35-2.
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of Charter rights.”150 Therefore, the supersession of Robertson’s interpretation of 
religious freedom should be understood as an expansion, not a displacement. 
The constitutional break that the Charter effected allowed the Court to 
re-ground the concept of religious freedom on individualist foundations, 
ignoring its institutional foundations. While Chief Justice Dickson emphasized 
the importance of religious freedom’s historical context, he asserted that “the 
origins of the demand for freedom of religion are to be found in the religious 
struggles of post-Reformation Europe.”151 Big M stands as a reflection of the 
Reformation’s individualization of religion since it emphasized the centrality of 
individual conscience and “the inappropriateness of governmental intervention 
to compel or constrain its manifestation.”152 As a historiography of religious 
freedom, this reflection is factually incorrect (as our earlier historical discussion 
illustrates) but also reductionist and constitutionally problematic. To an extent, 
this move followed directly from an individualist reading of the Reformation. 
Notions of libertas ecclesia and the English institution of an established church 
are not examples congenial to disestablishment; the explosion of denominational 
diversity evoked by the Reformation may seem more apt. But it is also dismissive 
of the ways in which institutional concerns are constitutive of religious practice 
and belief for many people, not only Christians.153 The passing on of tradition 
through private religious education, the performance of ritual and organized 
worship, the discharging of moral duties and procurement of mutual aid 
through religious charities, and even the submission to religious authority are 
not exclusive to Christianity, are not dependent on religious establishment, and 
are not intelligible as a mere aggregation of individual preferences. In deriving 
religious freedom from a peculiar reading of the Protestant experience, the Court 
in effect embedded a sectarian concept of religion into the Charter, one derived 
150. Ibid, ch 35.5, 35-12.
151. Big M, supra note 7 at para 118.
152. Ibid at para 121.
153. Of course, as the most cursory reading of European history after the Peace of Westphalia 
shows, it is historically inaccurate to identify the Reformation with disestablishment. 
This is not what Dickson CJ does, however, using the Reformations instead to invoke a 
flowering of diversity.
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from a highly intellectualized Enlightenment Protestantism that is not especially 
widespread among contemporary religious adherents.154
This historiography provides a further reason for the conceptual integration 
of religious freedom and freedom of conscience into a single unitary conception 
under the Charter. “It is from these antecedents,” Chief Justice Dickson writes, 
“that the concepts of freedom of religion and freedom of conscience became 
associated, to form, as they do in s 2(a) of our Charter, the single integrated 
concept of ‘freedom of conscience and religion.’”155 The integration of these two 
distinct concepts subordinates the enjoyment and benefit of religious freedom 
under the Charter to the ability to hold conscientious belief.156 The singular and 
unitary conception of religious freedom and conscience also introduced an air of 
redundancy to section 2(a), essentially obscuring the need for an independent 
understanding of freedom of conscience. As noted by Howard Kislowicz, 
Richard Haigh, and Adrienne Ng, the inclusion of conscience under section 
2(a) “is not an elegant variation of religion,” but should rather be seen “an 
independent freedom” essential to “giv[ing] the Charter’s terms full meaning.”157 
For Kislowicz, Haigh, and Ng, “‘[c]onscience,’ as an independent freedom, may 
154. It is a good question, to our knowledge not directly addressed by the case law, whether the 
different effect of religious individualism on different church structures could give rise to a s 
15 claim of “equal protection and equal benefit of the law.” See Charter, supra note 5, s 15(1). 
The issue has been briefly addressed by the US Supreme Court. See Mitchell v Helms, 530 
US 793 (2000) (a plurality opinion that deemed that a judicial test for classifying religious 
schools discriminated against Roman Catholic schools). But Supreme Court of Canada 
jurisprudence makes it difficult to draw analogies to Canadian law. See Adler, supra note 127.
155. Big M, supra note 7 at 361. We find it peculiar that post-Reformation Europe rather 
than post-Reformation Britain is the chosen historical antecedent for religious freedom 
under the Charter.
156. There is scant evidence in either direction of the reading of s 2 intended by the drafters, but 
there are strong indicia that the Charter did not intend to equate religion and conscience 
in this way. First, the term “conscience” makes a new appearance in the Charter, whereas 
it does not appear in the Bill of Rights (which protected only freedom of religion) or in the 
US Constitution (which was a source of inspiration for the Charter and is still used today in 
its interpretation for comparative effect). Second, we have first-hand testimony from Jean 
Chrétien who, while Minister of Justice, negotiated the Charter and recalls in his memoirs 
that Pierre Trudeau seemed committed to the dual language despite reluctance from the 
provincial governments. See Jean Chrétien, Straight from the Heart (Toronto: Key Porter 
Books, 1994) at 173. So we are left with the distinct impression that conscience and religion 
were intended to mean different things in the Charter, although the subject merits a more 
detailed discussion of the principles of statutory interpretation than is possible here.
157. “Calculations of Conscience: The Costs and Benefits of Religious and Conscientious 
Freedom” (2011) 48:3 Alta L Rev 679 at 707.
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[even] help bring back the very point of having religion and religious freedom.”158 
The conception espoused by Chief Justice Dickson is furthermore at odds with 
the recognition of non-natural persons’ capacity to enjoy the protection of other 
fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression and freedom of association.
As Benjamin Berger argues, in cases like Big M, “the dominant theme … 
was the disembedding of Christian privilege. … [F]reedom of religion was really 
about evenhandedness among religious and non-religious creeds, freedom from 
state-enforced religious practices or norms, and, in particular, disrupting the 
structural hegemony of Christianity.”159 But rather than extend individual and 
institutional religious protection to all creeds and consciences, the Court reduced 
all religious experience to individual belief, ignoring the pressing institutional 
claims of these now (only partially) protected religious systems.160
B. EDWARDS, HY & ZEL’S, AND THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY OF THE 
CORPORATION
Big M is also the source of confusing Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence 
on the religious liberties of corporations. Although the case involved a corporate 
158. Ibid at 713.
159. Berger, “Religious Diversity,” supra note 108 at 109. 
160. The extension of religious freedom, albeit in a reduced individualist form, to non-Christian 
creeds and conscientious believers appears to sit uncomfortably with the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decision in Adler, where the Court found that state support for Roman Catholic 
schools in Ontario—guaranteed under the Constitution Act, 1867—did not have to be 
extended to other religious denominations under Charter principles of religious freedom or 
equality. But the case is in every way the exception that proves the rule. Support for certain 
minority religious schools, the Court explained, “is the product of a historical compromise 
which was a crucial step along the road leading to Confederation.” Because s 93 “forms a 
comprehensive code with respect to denominational school rights,” it cannot be enlarged 
through the operation of s 2(a) of the Charter. Section 93 does not represent a guarantee of 
fundamental freedoms; it only entrenches “certain rights … which were enjoyed at the time 
of Confederation.” See Adler, supra note 127 at paras 29, 35. The 1867 provision implicitly 
acknowledges the importance of institutions in the life of a religious community (in this case 
the Roman Catholic community in Ontario and the Protestant communities in Quebec) 
and therefore supports our argument that religious institutionalism has always been a part of 
Canadian constitutional history. Yet the religious institutionalist claim does not depend on a 
claim to religious establishment. While a full explanation is outside the scope of this article, 
it should suffice to recall—from the historical account in the first section—that Hosius 
of Cordova wrote against the temporal encroachment on the authority of bishops before 
Theodosius’s edict, Cunctos Populous, made Nicene Christianity the official religion of the 
Empire in 380 CE; Pope Gelasius made identical statements afterwards. See Bettenson, supra 
note 58 at 31. Figgis also suggested that church autonomy may indeed be compromised by 
religious establishment. See Figgis, supra note 73 at 8. 
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legal person challenging the constitutionality of a law on the grounds of religious 
freedom, the Court did not conclusively determine whether a corporation—a 
religious corporation or a corporation simpliciter—could enjoy the protection 
conferred under section 2(a). Rather, according to Chief Justice Dickson: 
Whether a corporation can enjoy or exercise freedom of religion is … irrelevant. … 
[I]f the law impairs freedom of religion it does not matter whether the company can 
possess religious belief. … A law which itself infringes religious freedom is, by that 
reason alone, inconsistent with s 2(a) … and it matters not whether the [claimant] 
is … an individual or a corporation.161
Following this rationale, constitutional invalidity would be premised not 
on whether the corporation’s or institution’s rights had been violated, but 
simply on whether the impugned restriction on religious freedom is compatible 
with section 2(a). Yet even if it were contended that this represents a way of 
protecting religious institutionalism, it does so in a circuitous way that fails to 
account for the distinctive nature of religious freedom’s institutional dimensions. 
The emphasis on the corporate form does not distinguish between the rights 
of religious institutions and the religious rights of business entities (including 
corporations)—categories that inevitably overlap in particular cases yet are 
distinct in purpose, scope, and ontological significance.
R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd paid further attention to whether legal 
persons may invoke the guarantee of religious freedom.162 As an unofficial sequel 
to Big M, Edwards centered on a challenge to the Retail Business Holidays Act, 
the secular statute enacted following the Court’s invalidation of the Lord’s Day 
Act in Big M. However, the issue that attracts our attention is whether Edwards 
Books Ltd. could benefit from section 2(a). Chief Justice Dickson specified that 
he had “no hesitation in remarking that a business corporation cannot possess 
religious beliefs.”163 Without undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the 
above proposition, suffice it to say that Chief Justice Dickson’s statement is not 
conclusive on the issue of whether a religious corporation or institution may invoke 
and benefit from the protection found under section 2(a). Indeed, the question 
of whether a business corporation may invoke the guarantee is quite different 
from the question of whether an institution or body, whether incorporated or 
unincorporated and existing solely for religious purposes, may invoke section 
2(a). In this sense, it is possible to differentiate two categories of beneficiaries of 
religious institutionalism. Religious institutions qua religious institutions such 
161. Big M, supra note 7 at paras 40-41.
162. [1986] 2 SCR 713, 45 DLR (4th) 1 [Edwards cited to SCR].
163. Ibid at 784. 
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as churches and synagogues constitute the primary beneficiaries. The secondary, 
and admittedly more doubtful, beneficiaries are corporate entities whose claims 
to religious freedom, while less evident, theoretically could be demonstrated in 
appropriate circumstances.164
The problem was highlighted in the case of Hy and Zel’s Inc v Ontario 
(Attorney General).165 The claimants, commercial businesses owned by adherents 
of the Jewish faith, had been convicted of breaching the Retail Business Holidays 
Act but contested the statute’s constitutionality on religious freedom grounds. 
A key question was whether corporations have standing to seek a declaration 
of unconstitutionality. The majority proceeded on the assumption that the 
combined effect of Big M and Edwards had conclusively determined that 
corporations could not invoke the section 2(a) guarantee of religious freedom. 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of analysis, the majority assumed that corporations 
may hold religious rights but decided that the corporations did not have standing 
because there was no evidence or allegation that their rights were violated.166 
Thus, in the absence of evidence of a violation, standing could not be granted, 
and the question of whether the corporation could in fact invoke section 2(a) did 
not need to be revisited.167
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, directly attacked 
the majority’s treatment of corporate religious rights.168 The dissent rejected 
the argument that the issue of corporate religious rights had been conclusively 
determined. For Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, Big M
164. The view that a commercial business corporation is presumptively unable to claim the 
protection of religious freedom in its own name is consistent with the Supreme Court of 
Canada decision in Pollack. See Pollack v Comité Paritaire du Commerce de Détail à Québec, 
[1946] SCR 343 at 347, 2 DLR 801. The case pre-dates the Charter, but in it the Court 
held: “L’appelante étant une corporation commerciale, ne peut professer une religion ni lui 
appartenir.” This translates as: “The appellant being a commercial corporation, it can neither 
profess nor belong to a religion.”
165. [1993] 3 SCR 675, 107 DLR (4th) 634 [Hy and Zel’s cited to SCR].
166. Ibid at 693.
167. The restriction on standing proved controversial. In Big M, the corporation that sought to 
declare the Lord’s Day Act unconstitutional was a defendant in a criminal case, while in Hy & 
Zel’s, the corporation was a plaintiff in a civil action challenging the legislation under which 
it was being prosecuted. The different outcome was significantly determined by the Court’s 
restriction of public interest standing rules after Big M, a limitation that was widely criticized 
for being unnecessary and inefficient. See June M Ross, “Standing in Charter Declaratory 
Actions” (1995) 33:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 151; Hogg, supra note 132, ch 59.2(d)-(e), 59-3-6. 
We will nonetheless focus on the issue of institutional religious rights, which was a matter of 
dispute between the majority and the dissent.
168. Hy and Zel’s, supra note 165 at 680.
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did not decide that a corporation cannot invoke the rights guaranteed under s. 2(a) 
of the Charter … . Rather, the ratio of that case is the positive right of a corporation 
to rely on the Charter rights of others in defence to a criminal charge. The Court did 
not consider at all whether corporations may have rights under s. 2(a) of the Charter: 
it was held to be irrelevant, in view of the fact that no one could be convicted under 
an unconstitutional law, be it a corporation or an individual litigant.169 
The effect of Edwards was also highlighted. The dissent read the case as 
supporting the argument that corporate religious rights under the Charter have 
yet to be resolved. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé reminded the majority that that case 
had rejected only the invocation of section 2(a) for “business corporations.”170 The 
issue of whether a religious corporation may invoke the section 2(a) guarantee 
was therefore unresolved and in pressing need of clarification. Nevertheless, the 
Hy and Zel’s case forecasted two elements central to understanding any claim 
revolving on religion’s institutional dimensions. First, Hy and Zel’s did not 
extinguish the argument for corporate religious rights under the Charter; rather, 
in avoiding the question, the Court preserved the latent ambiguity created in Big 
M and Edwards. Second, the clash between the majority and dissent foreshadowed 
subsequent judicial division in important religious freedom cases. The overall 
tendency is the gradual and complete individualization of religion and the 
corresponding diminution of religious freedom’s institutional dimensions.
Before further exploring this tendency, it bears asking whether the Court’s 
discussion of business corporations has steered the debate over institutional 
religious freedom off course. In most cases, it has led to confusion. Peter Hogg, 
for instance, writes that some of the rights included in the Charter, whether 
guaranteed to “everyone” or to “any person,” are “by their very nature not available 
to a corporation.”171 Using Big M and Edwards as support, Hogg specifies that 
section 2(a) is inapplicable to corporations, as the latter “cannot hold a religious 
belief or any other belief.”172 One reason is that religious freedom is “founded 
in respect for the inherent dignity and the inviolable rights of the human 
person.”173 Hogg nonetheless also acknowledges the peculiarity posed by religious 
169. Ibid at 679 [emphasis added].
170. Ibid, citing Edwards, supra note 162 at 784, Dickson CJC.
171. The Charter includes several rights and freedoms, which, because of their very nature, may 
not be invoked by a corporation. For example, Hogg notes that “the right to fundamental 
justice under s. 7 does not apply to a corporation, because it is limited to deprivations of ‘life, 
liberty and security of the person’ which are attributes of individuals.” See Hogg, supra note 
132, ch 37.1(b), 37-2.
172. Ibid [emphasis added].
173. Big M, supra note 7 at 336.
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organizations and bodies. He affirms that “[t]here may be some corporations that 
are formed for the exercise of religious beliefs, for example, a church organized 
as a corporation.”174 But Hogg does not make clear whether religious freedom 
would inhere in the corporation itself or rather in the individual congregants 
constituting the religious community. 
This latent ambiguity appears to be another key reason why Chief Justice 
Dickson declined to determine the issue of religious corporations in Edwards. 
Although the appellant in that case was not a religious corporation and the 
Court ultimately rejected a business corporation’s ability to invoke section 2(a), 
Chief Justice Dickson raised the question of a religious corporation’s freedom of 
religion in obiter. For Chief Justice Dickson: 
A more difficult question is whether a corporate entity ought to be deemed in 
certain circumstances to possess the religious values of specified natural persons. If 
so, should the religion of the directors or shareholders or even employees be adopted 
as the appropriate test? What if there is a divergence of religious beliefs within the 
corporation?175 
Answering these questions about religious corporations one way or 
another would not entirely solve the issue of whether a collective dimension 
of religious freedom exists under the Charter because the question of whether 
a non-incorporated church, religious community, or collective may invoke 
section 2(a) would still remain open. Despite considerable judicial disagreement 
in several key religious freedom cases, this question has yet to be conclusively 
determined by the Court.  
The discussion of the possible section 2(a) rights of religious corporations 
is a distraction from a more important debate, however. When a business 
corporation has a religious objection to a law, it is because its directors or 
shareholders, individually or collectively, have reservations about it due to their 
individual beliefs. Ultimately, the case of the business corporation can be resolved 
as a special—and perhaps even subordinate—claim of religious individualism in 
which the different stakeholders’ rights are infringed. Nearly all cases of business 
corporations that have come before the courts fall under this model.
174. Hogg, supra note 132, ch 37.1(b), 37-2, n 3.
175. Edwards, supra note 162 at 785.
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C. TRINITY WESTERN AND THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF INSTITUTIONAL 
CONCERNS
The other side of the discussion over corporate form and religious rights is 
the relationship between individuals and institutions. This is a problem about 
derivability of rights: whether the institutional aspects of religion are merely the 
aggregation of individual rights-claims. A robust religious institutionalism argues 
that at least some important religious rights are not derivable from individual 
claims but rather that those individual claims are constituted by the institutional 
practice or by belief in the religious necessity of a certain institutional form. 
A robust institutionalism further recognizes that its distinctiveness compared to 
religion’s individual dimensions may give rise to concurrent infringements of the 
religious freedom belonging respectively to the institution and to its adherents 
and that these infringements may themselves take different forms. In other 
words, the same state action may infringe religious freedom in both its individual 
and institutional dimensions. We have discussed the philosophical and historical 
accounts in previous sections; here, we offer some examples of the deleterious 
effect that a denial of the distinct institutional claims of religious freedom has 
had on the case law. 
The Supreme Court of Canada had the opportunity to engage directly with 
post-Charter religious institutionalism in Trinity Western University v British 
Columbia College of Teachers.176 Trinity Western centered on a private religious 
educational institution associated with the Evangelical Free Church of Canada. 
Under an agreement with the British Columbia College of Teachers (“BCCT”), 
TWU established a five-year teacher training program. Enrolled students spent 
four years of the program at TWU, while the fifth year was spent at Simon 
Fraser University. Eventually, TWU applied to assume full responsibility for 
the program. The BCCT denied the application, citing TWU’s “Community 
Standards” document, which students signed as a condition of attendance at the 
school and which proscribed “homosexual behavior.”177 The BCCT found that 
teachers educated in TWU’s program would be likely to foster discriminatory 
practices in the public school system.178 
While recognizing the role of private religious institutions in the diversity 
of Canadian society,179 the Court’s analysis focused on the religious freedom 
of individual students attending TWU’s teaching program who were adversely 
176. Trinity Western, supra note 8.
177. Ibid at paras 2-4.
178. Ibid at para 5.
179. Ibid at paras 33-34.
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affected by the BCCT’s decision. This case was not about affirming TWU’s 
religious freedom under section 2(a); rather, the central issue was “to reconcile 
the religious freedom of individuals wishing to attend TWU with the equality 
concerns of students in BC’s school system.”180 The BCCT’s holding prevented 
TWU students “from expressing freely their religious beliefs” and “associating 
to put them into practice.”181 The BCCT’s failure to consider these effects on 
religious freedom rendered its decision unreasonable.
To consider the effect of the BCCT’s decision on TWU students, however, 
only captures a fraction of the religious freedom issues involved. Religious 
students at any institution are free to make private or public pledges of adherence 
to what they consider biblically mandated standards of sexual morality, but what 
was at stake here was the licensing of an educational program that prescribed 
adherence to such a standard as a condition of attendance. On the one hand, 
this concerns the ability of a private religious institution to prescribe behavioural 
standards as conditions to admission and continued membership. On the 
other, it concerns the ability of individual students to attend an institution that 
prescribes these standards. No aggregation of individual student beliefs can yield 
the desired institutional outcome.182 This is not to say that the outcome in Trinity 
180. Ibid at para 28 [emphasis added].
181. Ibid at para 32 [emphasis added].
182. To the Court’s credit, Iacobucci J and Bastarache J discussed the fact that the British 
Columbia Human Rights Code explicitly exempts a religious institution from its provisions 
“where it prefers adherents of its religious constituency.” See Trinity Western, ibid at para 
35. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the religious beliefs of private 
institutions are protected by the Human Rights Code but their graduates are not. See Human 
Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210, s 41. A similar exemption is common in human rights 
statutes across Canada. See e.g. Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H19, s 24(1). Ontario’s 
Human Rights Code was discussed in Christian Horizons. See Christian Horizons, supra note 
54. The Court addressed an analogous issue in Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, where it 
categorically stated that “the guarantee of religious freedom in s. 2(a) of the Charter is broad 
enough to protect religious officials from being compelled by the state to perform civil or 
religious same-sex marriages that are contrary to their religious beliefs.” See Reference re 
Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79 at para 60, [2004] 3 SCR 698. The subsequent legislation 
“recognized that officials of religious groups are free to refuse to perform marriages that are 
not in accordance with their religious beliefs.” See Civil Marriage Act, SC 2005, c 33, s 3. 
This, however, leaves some ambiguity about the capacity of a religious official whose beliefs 
favour the permissibility of same-sex marriage but whose congregation forbids it. Would a 
religious official be acting ultra vires by performing a same-sex marriage in that case and thus 
relinquish the dispensation that being a ‘religious official’ confers? Note that this right is, 
again, not primarily an individual right (which would protect religious persons in whatever 
capacity) but rather one derived from one’s status as a religious official (which presumes an 
institutional authority capable of naming the official in question).
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Western would have been different had the Court directly engaged with the 
evident institutional dimensions raised by the litigation. Instead, Trinity Western 
stands out as a missed opportunity to fully engage with religious institutionalism. 
Indeed, even though TWU was ultimately victorious, the Court’s exclusive 
focus on religion’s individual dimensions makes its judgment deficient. If an 
institutional religious freedom claim is itself individualized, or if the institution’s 
claims are not otherwise treated as institutional in nature, the victorious outcome 
is secondary. The victorious outcome would be arrived at despite the failure to 
engage with institutionalism on its actual terms or to recognize the particularity 
of the claims and interests involved. In instrumental terms, the victorious 
outcome might be paramount, but from the perspective of legal doctrine, such an 
outcome would be unfavourable. Indeed, as argued by Howard Kislowicz, “[A]n 
incomplete understanding of [religious] practice necessarily means an incomplete 
analysis of the impact of a particular policy on religious freedom.”183
D. AMSELEM AND THE SUBJECTIVIZATION OF RELIGION
The invocation of institutional authority sits uneasily with the current high 
mark in the Supreme Court of Canada’s religion jurisprudence, Amselem.184 
The case arose when a condominium association denied several Orthodox 
Jewish apartment owners permission to build individual sukkahs—temporary 
shelters where observant Jews traditionally take their meals during the festival of 
Sukkot—on their balconies. The association cited the building’s by-laws, which 
prohibited the erection of temporary structures on balconies. The association 
offered instead to set up a communal sukkah on the grounds of the building, 
but the owners did not consider this acceptable according to their understanding 
of the religious requirements of the holiday. At trial, both sides presented expert 
testimony from religious authorities on the proper, objective interpretation of the 
religious requirement.
The issue in Amselem did not directly implicate religious institutions. It was 
not the rights of a congregation, but rather those of individuals, that were at stake. 
But the Court’s articulation of religious freedom extended the individualistic 
conception introduced in Big M and made it even more difficult to appreciate 
the institutional aspects of religion. This articulation also enables courts to avoid 
disputes concerning religious doctrine entirely.185 Religious freedom, wrote 
Justice Iacobucci, “is integrally linked with an individual’s self-definition and 
183. Kislowicz, supra note 105 at 189.
184. Supra note 7.
185. Kislowicz, supra note 105 at 167.
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fulfillment.”186 This is because “freedom of religion exists in a matrix of other 
correspondingly important rights that attach to individuals.”187 Indeed, religious 
freedom concerns “freely and deeply held personal convictions or beliefs … the 
practices of which allow individuals to foster a connection with the divine.”188 
It is connected to an individual’s spiritual faith,” and inheres first and foremost as 
“a function of personal autonomy and choice.”189 An individual’s sincere religious 
belief may be protected “irrespective of whether a particular practice or belief 
is required by official religious dogma or is in conformity with the position of 
religious officials.”190 The only requirement is that the interference be “more than 
trivial or insubstantial.”191
This conception of religion has been called “subjective” for its exclusive 
reliance on the sincerity of the individual believer when determining whether 
a religious interest is at stake and is contrasted with an “objective” criterion 
that would require, as Justice Bastarache wrote in his dissent, that “[a] nexus 
between personal beliefs and the religion’s precepts … be established.”192 The 
complete subjectivization of religion tends to reduce it, as we have noted before, 
to a special claim of conscience, which renders the difference between religion 
and conscience irrelevant and pushes institutions out of the religious landscape. 
Yet it is not the individual case of religious freedom that tests the distinction 
between subjective and objective, but rather the institutional case. In the 
individual case, the distinction may be overblown, as Daniel Weinstock suggests 
in the article discussed in Part II, above.193 While an objective criterion may 
require that a claimant make reference to an “authoritative script” in establishing 
a religious conviction, this script need not be filtered through a religious official 
and its interpretation may be idiosyncratic.194 To be sure, a claimant will not 
186. Amselem, supra note 7 at para 42.
187. Ibid at para 1.
188. Ibid at para 39.
189. Ibid at paras 39, 42.
190. Ibid at para 46. This definition was adopted in Multani. See Multani v Commission scolaire 
Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6 at para 33, [2006] 1 SCR 256.
191. Ibid at paras 59-60. Interestingly, this second step in the Amselem test marks the return of 
objectivity as a controlling standard. The correct question when considering an infringement 
of section 2(a) is “whether a religious practice or belief exists that has been infringed” and not 
whether the claimant, subjectively and sincerely “believes that a religious practice or belief 
has been infringed.” See SL v Commission scolaire des Chênes, 2012 SCC 7 at para 24, [2012] 
1 SCR 235 [SL].
192. Amselem, supra note 7 at para 135.
193. “Beyond Objective,” supra note 51.
194. Ibid at 171-72.
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be precluded from demonstrating that a religious belief or practice is tied to an 
objective, communal, or institutional religious precept, and such a precept may 
be evidence of sincerity. But he or she will not be required to do so; objective 
external commands are thus transformed into subjective articles of conscience.195 
While such subjective reliance might be sufficient for a religious tradition that is 
suspicious of or indifferent to religious institutions,196 it is ill-equipped to capture 
the claims made in the name of collective or corporate religious entities that might 
not fit the moral psychology of “an individual’s self-definition and fulfillment.”197 
The conception of religion in Amselem has been called “decentralizing”198 
for its effect of shifting religious authority away from established hierarchies 
and towards the individual. It is not that Amselem is wrong in its protection 
of idiosyncratic religious believers; that is preferable to the alternative, which is 
a plurality of imposed orthodoxies. The problem is that Amselem’s conception 
of religion so distorts religious practice that it inhibits the articulation of any 
institutional dimension of religion. Amselem is the crucible of the Court’s insistence 
on divorcing religious freedom from its historical trajectory, on re-emphasizing 
religious freedom as a mere variant of freedom of conscience, and on refusing 
to extend constitutional protection beyond the concept’s individual dimensions. 
The reduction of religion to mere subjective belief strips the concept of its 
necessary institutional context, which, as intimated above, fulfills a fundamental 
structural role. Furthermore, Amselem has also severely impaired the intellectual 
instruments available to jurists in religious freedom litigation.
195. Benjamin L Berger, “Section 1, Constitutional Reasoning and Cultural Difference: Assessing 
the Impacts of Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2010) 51 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 
25 at 31 [Berger, “Section 1”].
196. Richard Moon suggests this as a possible interpretation of Iacobucci J’s (Protestant) opinion 
and Bastarache J’s (Roman Catholic) dissent: 
The justification and scope of freedom of religion was initially shaped by a Protestant 
conception of religious adherence, which saw religious belief as a personal and private 
commitment based on individual reason and judgment. Justice Bastarache may be drawing on 
a different conception of religion, and religious commitment; one that emphasizes the social 
and institutional character of religion, and regards religious belief not simply as a personal 
matter, but as tied to an established system and an institutional structure.
 See Richard Moon, “Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem” 
(2005) 29 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 201 at 209.
197. But see Muñiz-Fraticelli, Pluralism, supra note 20 at 186-222 (arguing in favour of the 
development of personality in associations like churches).
198. Berger, “Law’s Religion,” supra note 107 at 295-96, 303, 307-308.
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E. HUTTERIAN AND THE INTEREST IN COMMUNITY
The irreducibility of institutional religious freedom to individual religious 
freedom is not only in play in cases where it is the institution itself that raises 
a section 2(a) claim. Sometimes, the individual claim itself presupposes an 
institutional or communal context absent which the individual right is not 
properly apprehended, as the individual claim is partly constituted by the 
institutional context. Indeed, as suggested in our discussion of Trinity Western, 
individual claims and infringements of religious freedom may be concurrent 
with claims and infringements of an institutional nature, making judgments that 
fail to address the latter ultimately deficient. This is the case, most notably, in 
Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony,199 which “confirms for us that, as 
far as Canadian constitutionalism is concerned, freedom of religion is ultimately 
a matter of autonomy and choice.”200 
Hutterian involved a constitutional challenge of Alberta’s drivers’ licensing 
regulations by a Colony of Hutterites formally constituted through the legal form 
of the corporation.201 Regulations that previously exempted religious adherents 
from having their photographs taken were amended to make photographs 
mandatory on all drivers’ licences issued in the province. The Colony challenged 
the regulation under section 2(a), claiming a violation of their community’s 
religious freedom: The inability of members to drive legally might not have a 
great impact on each of them individually, but it would impose great cost on the 
maintenance of their communal lifestyle by preventing them from performing 
tasks necessary to sustain it. 
In a four-to-three decision, the Court held that the regulation, while 
infringing individual Hutterites’ religious freedom, was justified under section 1.202 
199. 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 SCR 567 [Hutterian].
200. Berger, “Section 1,” supra note 195 at 37.
201. See Kislowicz, supra note 105 at 177-78. Kislowicz cites the affidavit of Samuel Wirz, a 
member of the Wilson Colony, who confirms that the Colony was a religious communal 
organization constituted as a corporation.
202. Hutterian, supra note 199 at paras 4, 47, 104. Justification is established by 
demonstrating: first, that the limitation addresses a pressing and significant concern of 
sufficient importance to warrant overriding a Charter right or freedom and second, that 
there is proportionality between the infringement and the means employed to achieve the 
legislative objective. See e.g. PSAC v Canada, [1987] 1 SCR 424 at 439, 38 DLR (4th) 
249. Proportionality is established by showing: first, that there is a rational connection 
between the legislative objective and the infringement; second, that the measure limits 
the right or freedom no more than necessary to achieve the objective; and third, that the 
salutary effects of impairing the right or freedom outweigh the deleterious consequences. 
See e.g. Hutterian, supra note 199 at paras 47, 53-54, 72-74.
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Chief Justice McLachlin held that the deleterious effects of the photograph 
requirement on adherents’ religious freedom did not outweigh its salutary 
consequences: “A limit on the right that exacts a cost but nevertheless leaves the 
adherent with a meaningful choice about the religious practice … will be less 
serious than a limit that effectively deprives the adherent of such a choice.”203 
By contrast, Justices Abella and LeBel separately held that the infringement 
could not be justified. Whereas the majority conceived of the Hutterites’ claim 
in individualistic terms, Justices LeBel and Abella both emphasized its collective 
dimensions. The importance of this divergence cannot be understated. In fact, 
according to Justice LeBel, this “may perhaps explain [the majority’s] cursory 
treatment of the [Brethren’s] rights … in the course of the s[ection] 1 analysis.”204 
Justice Abella also highlighted the claim’s collective nature. Reminding the Court 
that “freedom of religion has both individual and collective aspects,” she noted 
that both aspects were engaged.205 Justice Abella found that the amendment would 
completely extinguish the Colony’s autonomous way of life and could therefore 
not be justified under section 1.206 In Justice Abella’s words, “To suggest … that 
the deleterious effects are minor because the Colony members could simply 
arrange for third-party transportation, fails to appreciate the significance of their 
self-sufficiency to the autonomous integrity of their religious community.”207
This point was echoed by Justice LeBel, for whom freedom of religion 
is both “complex and highly textured.”208 Courts must recognize that section 
2(a) “incorporates a right to establish and maintain a community of faith,” as 
well as other collective dimensions.209 Religion is a communal experience for 
many adherents, which entails a nuanced constitutional analysis. In the words 
of Justice LeBel:
Religion is about religious beliefs, but also about religious relationships. [This case] 
signals the importance of this aspect. It raises issues about belief, but also about the 
maintenance of communities of faith … that share … a common faith and a way 
of life that is viewed by its members as a way of living that faith and of passing it on 
to future generations.210
203. Ibid at para 95.
204. Ibid at para 182.
205. Ibid at paras 130-31.
206. Ibid at paras 163-66.
207. Ibid at para 167.
208. Ibid at para 181.
209. Ibid.
210. Ibid at para 182 [emphasis added].
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Interestingly, Chief Justice McLachlin did not dispute that religion includes 
individual and collective aspects. However, she emphasized, most contentiously, 
the importance of clarity about “the relevance of those aspects at different 
stages of the [section 1] analysis.”211 Whereas the dissent would have considered 
community impact at every stage, the Chief Justice held that it was only relevant 
at the balancing stage of the proportionality analysis. As such, even where 
community impact is established, it does not “transform the essential claim—that 
of the individual claimants for photo-free licenses—into an assertion of a group 
right.”212 This characterization should not surprise those familiar with the Court’s 
jurisprudence on section 2(a), for while the majority acknowledges religion’s dual 
strains, it repeatedly re-emphasizes religion’s individualistic dimension. As a result, 
“one is left with a sense of a failure to grapple what it means to the traditional life 
of this religious community to lose the self-sufficiency that it enjoyed by having 
members that are able to drive.”213 
It seems probable that the decision would had been different if the Hutterites’ 
concerns for “the autonomous integrity of their religious community” had been 
taken seriously as intrinsic to and constitutive of their religious practice, not as an 
incidental expression of their faith. In the first place, such a consideration would 
have reflected the Hutterites’ own understanding of their religious obligation as 
situated in their communal institutions. Second, by multiplying the objections 
of individual Hutterites to the photography requirement by the injury posed 
to their communal mode of life, it would have increased the total weight of the 
section 2(a) infringement, shifting the balance away from section 1 justification. 
The later adoption of Justice Abella’s dissenting position in Hutterian by the 
majority in Loyola, which gave victory to a religious institution over a provincial 
regulation, is evidence of this shift.
Howard Kislowicz has observed that the majority’s judgment in Hutterian 
is emblematic of a failure to give proper respect to two central values: respect 
and self-awareness. On one side, the majority’s avoidance of the communal 
dimensions of the Hutterites’ religious freedom demonstrates a failure to respect 
the litigants,214 insofar as it denies the Colony’s independent agency as a religious 
community organized as an institution. On the other, the majority’s failure to 
engage with those same dimensions typifies the Court’s lack of self-awareness 
211. Ibid at para 31.
212. Janet Epp Buckingham, “Drivers Needed: Tough Choices from Alberta v. Wilson Colony of 
Hutterian Brethan” (2010) 18:3 Const Forum Const 109 at 112.
213. Berger, “Section 1,” supra note 195 at 40 [emphasis in original]. 
214. Kislowicz, supra note 105 at 188.
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concerning its normative commitment to individualism.215 It may be, however, 
that the majority was in fact fully aware of this normative commitment and refused 
to budge when confronted with the claims asserted by the Wilson Colony.216 
Richard Moon observes that the decision in Hutterian is “not out of line” 
with cases such as Edwards and Trinity Western, in which the Court accepted 
accommodation “only because, in its view, the exception would not compromise 
the law’s purpose in any meaningful way.”217 In these cases, the Court was only 
prepared to accept a minimal impairment of governmental purpose. The result 
of the Court’s jurisprudence has been an erosion of minority religious rights, 
no doubt because the common life of these groups often takes forms at odds 
with the majority’s legal order.218 From the perspective religious minorities, this 
erosion has in turn given rise to resistance to the perceived hegemony of state 
secularism and to a subtle shift from freedom of religion to freedom from the 
secular.219 Religious freedom generally, and institutionalism specifically, is here 
being used as a shield to protect religious groups from intrusion by a secular 
government rather than as a sword to forcibly impose sectarian interests on the 
broader community through constitutional litigation.
But the measure of impairment depends, in part, on what interests are 
being impaired. If only individual interests, considered separately, are at stake, 
the impairment may appear small in each case and to each person. If the 
collective effects of state action are taken into account, however, it becomes 
clearer that some governmental action severely interferes with the ability of 
religious communities to sustain a common life. Now, collective interests are not 
necessarily institutional. It is one thing for members of a religious community 
to ask courts to consider the impact of regulation on their ability to maintain 
a common life and another for a formally constituted religious institution to 
assert its own interests in autonomy and self-governance. But the institutional 
215. Ibid.
216. Kislowicz observes that the Court’s refusal to budge may be attributed to the fact that “the 
deep collectivism of the Hutterite worldview … reveal[ed] a view of religion at odds with the 
Court’s focus on the individual aspects of religious practice.” See Kislowicz, ibid at 157. 
217. “Accommodation Without Compromise: Comment on Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of 
Wilson Colony” (2010) 51 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 96 at 128. See also Marshall Haughey, “The 
Camera and the Colony: A Comment on Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” 
(2011) 74:1 Sask L Rev 59; Sara Weinrib, “An Exemption for Sincere Believers: The 
Challenge of Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2011) 56:3 McGill LJ 719.
218. Margaret H Ogilvie, “The Failure of Proportionality Tests to Protect Christian Minorities 
in Western Democracies: Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2010) 12:2 
Ecclesiastical LJ 208 at 213.
219. Berger, “Religious Diversity,” supra note 108 at 113-14.
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is best seen in relation to the collective, as religious institutions are a way for 
religious communities to sustain and focus common endeavours. For some, 
religious institutions may be necessary for religious doctrine to be defined and 
religious practice to be carried out. As indicated above, the Wilson Colony, a 
religious community, had chosen to organize itself under the legal form of the 
corporation, the secular vehicle through which a religious community or group 
expresses itself to and is cognizable by secular state institutions, including the 
law. In any event, whether the collectivity is formally institutionalized or not, 
the interests involved are constituted by the collective endeavour and are distinct 
from whatever interests the individual conscience may invoke.
Despite these problems, Hutterian had some positive implications. The 
decision signalled the need for further judicial consideration of the ambiguities 
raised by the majority and dissent. As Janet Epp Buckingham suggested, “Given 
that [Hutterian] is a split decision by a less than full panel of the Supreme Court 
of Canada, it is not likely the final word on the place of the communal aspects of 
religion” in Canadian constitutional culture.220 Rather, it is the opening salvo of 
further deliberation. This proved true in Loyola, in which the central argument of 
Hutterian was effectively (and surprisingly) reversed.
F. LOYOLA AND THE RECOVERY OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONALISM
We come, at last, to Loyola, which promised to be the case that would definitively 
answer the question of whether religious institutions were directly protected by 
section 2(a) freedom of religion.221 To some extent, the Court acknowledged 
the importance of religious institutions, but a narrow majority again avoided 
the direct question of the rights of religious organizations. Still, Loyola is an 
important case in many respects. In addition to its engagement with the collective 
or institutional aspects of religious freedom, it also elaborates on the proper 
standard of review of administrative decisions and presents a broad framework 
for evaluating educational policies that bear on the teaching of religion and ethics 
in a secular democracy. We will focus here on the issues that bear directly on 
religious institutions, although these include the permissibility and boundaries of 
sectarian religious education. We will largely put aside, however, the important 
but distinct questions of administrative law that are raised in the case. But before 
delving directly into the Loyola decision, some context about the history of 
religious education in Quebec is appropriate.
220. Supra note 212 at 116.
221. Supra note 9.
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1. EDUCATION AND RELIGION IN QUEBEC
The controversy over the Charter rights of religious institutions in Loyola is 
distinct from, but related to, the broader controversy over religious education 
in Quebec.222 Our concern is not primarily with the merits of civic or religious 
instruction.223 Yet educational policy is intimately linked to the institutional 
aspect of religious liberty. The education of children is the way in which a 
community reproduces itself, whether that community is the state or the church, 
and the struggle for control of educational institutions reflects a larger struggle 
over the nature and boundaries of community.224 In turn, this struggle provides 
fertile ground for analyzing the limits of permissible state interference with the 
autonomy of religious institutions.
The first educational institutions in what is now Quebec were founded by 
the Jesuit order in the seventeenth century, although “education was a marginal 
activity in the colony” until the nineteenth century.225 Attempts at reform after 
the British conquest provoked a reaction from Roman Catholic authorities who, 
perhaps rightly, feared assimilation.226 From this moment, the tone of religious 
education in Quebec was set: It would continue, through to Loyola, to be a 
battleground over difference, dissent, and assimilation of religious and linguistic 
222. Shauna Van Praagh, “From Secondary School to the Supreme Court of Canada and Back: 
Dancing the Tango of ‘Ethics and Religious Culture,’” online: (2012) Fides et Libertas 102 
<www.irla.org/assets/public/files/fides/Fides_2012.pdf>. Van Praagh notes, “[T]he Loyola 
litigation illustrates the difficulty in disentangling the strands of meaning of Ethics and 
Religious Culture [in Quebec] … . The combination of [SL] and Loyola High School … 
represent[s] an invitation to consider who the people are, where they are coming from, and 
how education, religion, and identity continue to evolve in Quebec in the 21st century” (ibid 
at 114, 116). We further discuss SL in this section. See infra notes 235-236.
223. For some recent commentary that does concern itself with the intersection of religion, 
education, and civic participation in the context of the Ethics and Religious Culture 
curriculum addressed in Loyola, see Berger, “Religious Diversity,” supra note 108; Van Praagh, 
supra note 222. See also Jean-Marc Larouche, “La formation éthique et la citoyenneté 
démocratique” in Fernand Ouellet, ed, Quelle formation pour l’enseignement de l’éthique à 
l’école? (Saint-Nicolas, Que: Presses de l’Université Laval, 2006) 173; Daniel Weinstock, “Un 
cours d’éthique et de culture religieuse: prochain épisode d’un malentendu?” in Ouellet, 
supra note 223, 187; Pierre Lucier, “Éthique et culture religieuse à l’école québécoise: les défis 
de la nouveauté” in Ouellet, supra note 223, 197.
224. Berger, “Religious Diversity,” supra note 108 at 106, 109, 111. See also Van Praagh, supra 
note 222 at 106.
225. Roger Magnuson, A Brief History of Quebec Education from New France to Parti Québécois 
(Montreal: Harvest House, 1980) at 9.
226. Ibid at 24. See also Jean-Pierre Charland, Histoire de l’éducation au Québec: De l’ombre du 
clocher à l’économie du savoir (Saint-Laurent, Que: ERPI, 2005) at 63.
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minorities—Roman Catholics and Francophones in English Canada, Protestants 
and Anglophones in Lower Canada, and now Anglophone Catholics (Loyola’s 
constituency) in an increasingly secular Quebec.
After Confederation, Quebec’s educational system continued to be dominated 
by the Roman Catholic Church, while provision for separate Protestant schools, 
and reciprocal rights for Catholics in Ontario, were enshrined in the Constitution 
Act of 1867. The Church resisted state intervention in education, fearful that it 
would precipitate anticlerical sentiments like those of the French Third Republic 
and the German Kulturkampf.227 The result was complete suppression of public 
education until the Liberal victory of Jean Lesage in 1960 inaugurated the 
Quiet Revolution.228 A felt need for reorganization and reinforcement of secular 
educational institutions led to the convening of a royal commission—dubbed the 
Commission Parent for its president, Monseigneur Alphonse-Marie Parent—to 
propose thoroughgoing reforms to the educational system.229 Only one member 
of the commission was openly in favor of de-confessionalization. The rest of the 
members proposed a compromise (only implemented in attenuated form) but 
guaranteed the continuation of publicly subsidized private schools, including 
religious schools under ecclesiastical control.230 The secular system was not set up 
until after another commission, the Estates General on Education, recommended 
the transformation of confessional school boards into linguistic ones (which 
required an amendment, in 1997, to section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867) and 
replacement of sectarian moral education with a cultural and civic counterpart 
(which would eventually become the Ethics and Religious Culture (“ERC”) 
curriculum).231 While de-confessionalization of public schools was formalized in 
2000, and repeals of provisions maintaining student choice in religious and moral 
227. Magnuson, supra note 225 at 43.  
228. Indeed, the impetus for de-confessionalization of Quebec schools began when the Jesuits 
made a request to convert the Collège Sainte-Marie—the original Jesuit institution from 
which Loyola High School was created—into a religious university. See e.g. Gabriel Gosselin 
& Claude Lessard, eds, Les deux principales réformes de l’éducation du Québec moderne: 
Témoignages de ceux et celles qui les on initiées (Quebec: Presses de l’Université Laval, 2007). 
For primary documents on the debate surrounding the Parent commission, see Claude 
Corbo & Jean-Pierre Couture, eds, Repenser l’école: Une anthologie des débats sur l’éducation au 
Québec de 1945 au rapport Parent (Montreal: Presses Universitaires de Montréal, 2000).
229. Gosselin & Lessard, supra note 228 at 13. This need for reorganization was the first step in 
a “fifty-year process of disentanglement of religion and education in Quebec.” See Berger, 
“Religious Diversity,” supra note 108 at 111. 
230. Gosselin & Lessard, supra note 228 at 60.
231. Commission for the Estates General on Education, Renewing our Education System: Ten 
Priority Actions (Quebec: Ministry of Education, 1996) at 82.
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instruction occurred in 2005, the private school system was largely untouched.232 
The most significant change was the universal implementation of the ERC 
program in 2008, designed “to prepare children for life in a pluralistic society, to 
educate them in the range of religious traditions that they might encounter, and 
to teach them about the religious heritage of Quebec.”233 The program fostered 
the development of competency in the cultural aspects of world religions, ethics, 
and dialogue. Key objectives of the program included the recognition of others 
and the pursuit of the common good. Instruction in religion was to be wholly 
cultural, with specific exclusion of discussion of doctrine.
In the ERC program’s inaugural year, the parents of several children enrolled 
in a Quebec public school requested that their children be exempted from 
the program on the grounds that its neutral and pluralistic approach “would 
inculcate a kind of relativism”234 that interfered with their parental right to raise 
their children in accordance with Catholic religious beliefs. The Supreme Court 
of Canada eventually reviewed the parents’ claims in SL v Commission scolaire des 
Chênes. The Court accepted the parents’ sincere belief in the deleterious effect that 
the course would have on their children but found little evidence that the course 
would in fact have that effect. The Court recognized “[t]he right of parents to 
bring up their children in their faith [as] part of the freedom of religion guaranteed 
by the Canadian Charter”235 but nonetheless concluded that although “exposure 
can be a source of friction, it does not in itself constitute an infringement” of 
religious freedom” under the Canadian Charter or Quebec Charter.236 
A central premise of the decision in SL was that the state should remain 
neutral between different religious traditions and, in particular, express such 
a neutral position in public instruction. This is a problematic assumption at a 
philosophical level237 but is significantly less problematic when the state itself 
232. Bill 118, An Act to amend various legislative provisions respecting education as regards 
confessional matters, 1st Sess, 36th Leg, Quebec, 2000, ss 53-55; Bill 95, An Act to amend 
various legislative provisions of a confessional nature in the education field, 1st Sess, 37th Leg, 
2005 (assented to 17 June 2005). The government of Quebec also amended section 41 of the 
Quebec Charter as well as section 5 of the Education Act in order to eliminate the requirement 
that confessional religious education be provided in public school, but, again, private schools 
were largely untouched. See Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR c C-12, st 41 
[Quebec Charter]; Education Act, RSQ c I-13.3, s 5. The amendment of section 41 is widely 
regarded as necessary to prevent challenges from religious minorities affected by the changes.
233. Berger, “Religious Diversity,” supra note 108 at 112.
234. Ibid.
235. SL, supra note 191 at para 50.
236. Ibid at para 40. 
237. Berger, “Religious Diversity,” supra note 108.
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is the educator, especially when the non-neutral alternative is considered.238 
When the state is the educator, it acts as arbiter of opinion and as a speaker in 
its own right. As such, there ought to be constraints on its expression of favour 
for one or another religion. However, when the educator is a religious school, 
the constraints are different since neutrality is necessarily absent. Moreover, 
religious institutions have a special interest when it comes to religious and moral 
education because conveying an educational message on these subjects is not 
limited to communication of facts but includes normative expression and possible 
endorsement of controversial positions. Religious schools, in effect, are speaking 
for themselves when they dictate how their teachers address their students, and 
they have an interest in their message being sincere and consonant with their 
mission and values. This was the issue in Loyola.
2. THE ROAD TO LOYOLA
The Loyola case was brought by Loyola High School, a private Roman Catholic 
school administered by the Jesuit order.239 As part of the school’s curriculum, 
students received instruction on world religions and ethical systems through 
a program of the school’s own design, which was admittedly grounded on a 
Jesuit and Roman Catholic framework. In March 2008, the school petitioned 
Quebec’s Minister of Education, Recreation, and Sports for an exemption from 
the mandatory ERC course in order to continue to teach its pre-existing religion 
and ethics program. Such exemptions were contemplated by section 22 of the 
Regulation respecting the application of the Act respecting private education.240 Loyola 
argued that its own program was substantively equivalent to the ERC course in 
the values it fostered and the material it covered. Loyola nonetheless maintained 
238. A more radical position—that “children ought not to learn about other religions or at least 
ought not to learn about them in a way that did not make clear that they were erroneous”— 
is also out of place in public education. See Richard Moon, “Freedom of Religion Under 
the Charter of Rights: The Limits of State Neutrality” (2012) 45:2 UBC L Rev 497 
at 547-48, n 10.
239. The school is organized as a corporation without share capital in Quebec. See Companies 
Act, CQLR c C-38, Part III. In addition to the school, John Zucchi, father of a student 
enrolled in Loyola, appeared as a plaintiff in his own name and that of his son. This was 
done presumably as a safeguard in the event that Loyola’s own religious freedom claims were 
rejected, but at no point in the proceedings did the case turn on his arguments as distinct 
from those of the schools or the “Loyola community” in general.
240. CQLR c E-9.1, r 1, s 22 [Private Education Regulation]. Section 22 reads: “Every institution 
shall be exempt from the application of the first paragraph of section 32 of the Act respecting 
private education (chapter E-9.1) provided the institution dispenses programs of studies 
which the Minister of Education, Recreation and Sports judges equivalent.”
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that the ERC course’s proposed neutrality (which, Loyola argued, was conducive 
to moral relativism) was incompatible with the school’s Catholic mission.241 
The Minister denied the school’s request, arguing that no course taught from 
a confessional or sectarian perspective could be deemed equivalent to the ERC. 
Furthermore, the Minister contended that Loyola’s course addressed religious 
faith directly (not merely its cultural aspects) and examined other religions and 
ethical dilemmas with reference to Roman Catholicism (instead of taking them 
on their own terms without reference to another tradition).
Loyola brought the suit on its own behalf as a private Catholic institution. 
The substance of its argument was that the Minister’s refusal to exempt it from 
teaching ERC amounted to state coercion over religious instruction, forcing 
Loyola to teach religion and ethics contrary to Catholic precepts. Loyola argued 
that this constituted an infringement of its rights to religious expression, belief, 
and practice under the Canadian Charter and Quebec Charter, as it impeded the 
school’s religious mission in three important ways: first, the refusal to grant an 
exemption prevented Loyola from teaching ethics and religion according to its 
religious approach; second, it forced Loyola to teach religion and ethics from a 
secular perspective; and third, it deprived the school of the meaningful choice 
to continue adhering to its religion. The refusal placed Loyola in an untenable 
position: either it could teach ERC according to secular Ministerial direction and 
violate its own religious precepts or it could teach ethics and religious culture 
in a manner faithful to its religious precepts and violate the law.242 The Minister 
argued that Loyola, as a corporate non-natural person, was precluded from 
invoking the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion under the Canadian 
Charter and Quebec Charters. Alternatively, the Minister maintained that even if 
Loyola was directly protected by religious freedom, the ERC program and the 
denial of an exemption constituted reasonable limitations on those rights.243
The school won at the trial level. In a lengthy judgment centrally concerned 
with then unsettled aspects of administrative law, the judge determined that, 
given the character of the school, the practice of religious instruction, and the 
use of the word “person” in the Canadian Charter and Quebec Charter, nothing 
in the law precluded a corporate person from invoking freedom of religion. The 
Court of Appeal overturned the ruling, however. This was due in part to the 
241. The exchange of letters between the Minister and the school is included in the trial court 
opinion. See Loyola High School c Courchesne, 2010 QCCS 2631 at paras 31-40, [2010] RJQ 
1417 [Loyola, QCCS].
242. Ibid at paras 265, 268-69.
243. Loyola, supra note 9 at paras 30-31.
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Supreme Court of Canada’s intervening decision in Doré v Barreau du Québec 
on the proper standard of review of administrative decisions involving Charter 
provisions.244 But the appellate opinion also engaged, somewhat tangentially, the 
question of Loyola’s own freedom of religion. The Court of Appeal dismissed 
outright the idea that there was any special consequence to the religious nature 
of the school245 and refused (as the Supreme Court of Canada had always done) 
to answer the question of institutional religious freedom directly. Taking a page 
from Hy and Zel’s, the Court of Appeal merely assumed, for the purpose of its 
analysis, that Loyola, as a corporation, could enjoy constitutional protection of 
freedom of religion and that it had demonstrated a sincere belief regarding its 
religious duty to teach the ERC program from a Catholic perspective.246 Yet in the 
end, the appellate court concluded that the Minister was entitled to deference in 
her refusal of Loyola’s request for an exemption specifically because the proposed 
substitute was religious in nature.247 The Court of Appeal also characterized the 
infringement of Loyola’s religious rights as negligible.248 Citing Hutterian, it held 
that the imposition of a single ERC class does not truly threaten religious belief 
or behaviour, as Loyola retained control over the majority of its educational and 
244. 2012 SCC 12 at paras 55-56, [2012] 1 SCR 395 [Doré]. Rendered after the trial court’s 
decision, Doré established that challenges to administrative decisions on Charter grounds are 
to be analyzed under administrative law principles (ibid at paras 55-58). Therefore, courts 
may no longer subject such decisions to the s 1 Oakes analysis under the Charter or to the 
s 9.1 analysis under the Quebec Charter. However, in an exercise of “cross-fertilization” of 
Charter and administrative principles, Doré also provides that administrative decision makers, 
including Ministers, are bound to consider Charter values in rendering their decisions. As an 
“enriched conception of administrative law,” the Charter analysis of administrative decisions 
will centre on proportionality—that is, on ensuring that the Ministerial decision (or action) 
interferes with the affected Charter guarantee no more than is necessary in order to achieve 
the statutory objectives. A decision that fails to satisfy this test will be deemed unreasonable 
under the reasonableness standard of judicial review. Indeed, the manner that deference to 
legislative choice is applied in the Oakes test is expressed with exactly the same language as 
we find under reasonableness review in administrative law: In both cases, the government’s 
action must fall within a range of reasonable constitutional alternatives. See E Fox-Decent, 
“The Charter and Administrative Law: Cross-Fertilization in Public Law” in Colleen 
M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 1st ed (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery, 2008) 169; E Fox-Decent & A Pless, “The Charter and Administrative Law: 
Cross-Fertilization or Inconstancy” in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative 
Law in Context, 2nd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2013) 407 at 422-24.
245. Québec (Procureur général) c Loyola High School, 2012 QCCA 2139, [2012] RJQ 2112.
246. Ibid at paras 167-68.
247. Ibid at paras 13, 120, 124, 126.
248. Ibid at para 168.
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religious curriculum.249 In the Court of Appeal’s view, nothing in the Minister’s 
decision placed an obstacle to Catholic doctrine and faith.250 Thus, in exercising 
the discretion conferred under the Private Education Regulation,251 the Minister 
correctly balanced Loyola’s assumed Charter rights to religious freedom with the 
statutory objective of secularizing the Quebec school system. 
The Supreme Court of Canada asked the parties to address directly both the 
question of whether Loyola enjoyed religious freedom under section 2(a) and 
whether the Minister’s decision bore scrutiny under the appropriate standard 
of review. The two questions were related since Loyola argued that whether the 
standard of review was correctness (as the trial court held) or reasonableness (as 
the Court of Appeal found), the Minister’s decision would not bear scrutiny 
precisely because she had not properly considered the right at issue, namely the 
institutional religious freedom of the school. Eleven intervenors filed briefs with 
the court, all in support of Loyola’s request for an exemption and all but one in 
support of the position that religious freedom should extend to at least some 
corporate bodies.252
Ironically, in the final decision, a majority of the Court again expressly 
declined to answer the fundamental question of religious institutionalism but 
in the process clarified the positions at stake and pointed towards a horizon on 
which they might be resolved. The judges unanimously decided in favor of Loyola 
but were divided over important details about the nature and implications of the 
rights in question and the extent of religious protection to teach a confessional 
curriculum, in addition to the immediate remedy to be provided in the case. Justice 
Abella, writing for the majority, found that section 2(a) of the Charter protected 
the “religious freedom of the members of the Loyola community who seek to offer 
and wish to receive a Catholic education”253 but did not find it necessary to decide 
if corporations themselves were constitutionally protected.254 Applying the Doré 
framework of proportionality, she concluded that the Minister’s refusal to deny 
Loyola the right to teach Roman Catholicism from a confessional perspective was 
249. Ibid at paras 173-74.
250. Ibid at para 182.
251. Private Education Regulation, supra note 240.
252. The exception was the Faith, Fealty & Creed Society, a charity apparently formed for the 
express purpose of intervening in the case. Its arguments are interesting, as they express a 
strong Congregationalist stance at odds with the more hierarchical position upheld by Loyola 
and the Roman Catholic interveners. See Loyola, supra note 9 (Factum of the Intervener at 
paras 7, 10-17, 25-33).
253. Loyola, supra note 9 para 32.
254. Ibid at para 33.
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disproportionate to the valid state objectives in the ERC curriculum. However, 
the importance of these objectives—which had been deemed constitutional in 
SL255—also limited the scope of Loyola’s exemption to the teaching of Roman 
Catholic religion and ethics.256 Other religious traditions and religious ethics 
would have to be taught from the neutral perspective advocated by the ERC 
program, although “[a] school like Loyola must be allowed some flexibility as it 
navigates these difficult moments [of teaching other ethical frameworks].”257
The concurrence of Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Moldaver was 
significantly more accommodating of Loyola’s claim. From the start, Chief 
Justice McLachlin and Justice Moldaver concluded that “Loyola as a religious 
organization is entitled to the constitutional protection of freedom of religion.”258 
Such protection is required as a condition of protecting individual freedom of 
religion259 but is not derived from or predicated on the religious freedom of 
teachers, parents, or students (and presumably other individual members) of the 
institution.260 It is “the religious freedom of Loyola itself.”261 As to the Minister’s 
substantive reasons for refusing Loyola an exemption from the ERC program, the 
concurrence denied that the objectives and competencies of the ERC program 
255. SL, supra note 190 at paras 26-27 (holding that the ERC does not infringe on the Charter 
rights of Roman Catholic parents of children attending public school). 
256. It is important to note that at the trial level, Loyola had sought an exemption from the entire 
ERC curriculum, but by the time the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, it had 
modified its position, asking instead for a more limited exemption to teach Roman Catholic 
religion and ethics from a confessional perspective. Thus, the Court’s ruling agreed with the 
school’s modified demand. See Loyola, supra note 9 at para 31.
257. An important confusion in the majority decision, but not one pertinent to our discussion, 
is the conflation of the religion and ethics components of ERC. The two are distinct in the 
course, but the majority opinion only refers to “religious ethics.” Daniel Weinstock, one of 
the drafters of the ethics component of the course, expressed frustration with this aspect of 
the decision, observing that while the Court opinion
clearly does prohibit Loyola from teaching ethics from a narrowly confessional Catholic 
perspective, it implies that ethical discussion normally occurs from within religious perspectives, 
and that the kind of fairness and neutrality implied in the [ERC] involves being fair between 
the ethical frameworks contained in different religious traditions, rather than separating ethics 
and religion altogether. This is precisely the denial of the autonomy of ethics with respect to 
religion that I had seen as a risk when the course was first introduced.
 See Daniel Weinstock, “What Did Loyola Really Decide?” (21 March 2015), In Due Course 
(blog), online: <www.induecourse.ca/what-did-loyola-really-decide>. 
258. Loyola, supra note 9 at para 88.
259. Ibid at paras 91-94.
260. Ibid at para 130.
261. Ibid at para 131.
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could only be taught from a cultural and non-denominational perspective. 
Instead, it should be sufficient for Loyola’s teachers to “describe and explain the 
ethical beliefs and doctrines of other religions in an objective and respectful way” 
while maintaining “a respectful tone of debate.”262
3. THE ROAD FROM LOYOLA
It is too early to draw any conclusions about the possible effects of the Loyola 
decision, but some preliminary analysis is warranted.263 Three vectors of 
disagreement seem especially relevant. The first concerns the identity of the 
rights-holder: Justice Abella’s majority opinion is concerned with “the religious 
freedom of members of the Loyola community,”264 while the concurrent opinion 
authored by the Chief Justice and Justice Moldaver argues directly for the religious 
freedom of the institution. Now, some authors have argued that communities 
can be rights-holders.265 These rights are grounded in the presence of collective 
interests, of factors contributing to the common good of its members.266 This 
position seems close to Justice Abella’s majority opinion in Loyola and consistent 
with her previous dissent in Hutterian, where she argued precisely that the 
collective interest of Hutterites in preserving their way of life required a different 
balance of interests than the consideration of individual members. According to 
her majority reasons in Loyola:
Religious freedom under the Charter must … account for the socially embedded 
nature of religious belief, and the deep linkages between this belief and its 
manifestation through communal institutions and traditions … . … The Minister’s 
decision therefore demonstrably interferes with the manner in which the members 
262. Ibid at para 162.
263. Loyola has been briefly referenced once already by the Supreme Court of Canada. See 
Mouvement laïque québécois v Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 SCR 3 (referencing 
Loyola briefly on the general principle of administrative review). It was also mentioned 
without comment by the Alberta Human Rights Tribunal. See Amir and Nazar v Webber 
Academy Foundation, 2015 AHRC 8 at para 123. For a more interesting discussion, 
see Fondation internationale Azzahra inc c Cour du Québec, 2015 QCCS 1307 at paras 
63-64, 254 ACWS (3d) 700 [Fondation internationale] (declaring a Muslim non-profit 
foundation to be a religious corporation eligible for a property tax exemption by analogy to 
Loyola High School).
264. Loyola, supra note 9 at para 32.
265. See Dwight Newman, Community and Collective Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) 
(arguing that collectivities have moral rights irreducible to those of their members provided 
that they meet certain conditions).
266. Ibid at 61.  
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of an institution formed for the very purpose of transmitting Catholicism, can teach 
and learn about the Catholic faith.267
But earlier, Justice Abella equivocated between the individual and collective 
grounds of the right at stake, when she wrote that the Minister’s action “represents 
a disproportionate, and therefore unreasonable interference with the values 
underlying freedom of religion of those individuals who seek to offer and who 
wish to receive a Catholic education at Loyola.”268 
A problem with Justice Abella’s position is that it gives no definite place 
to religious institutions within a community. This leads to problems in cases 
of conflict or dissent. Applying the Abella approach, courts must ask what 
the interests of the community are and how the institution fosters them and 
adjudicate between the perceptions of different individual members regarding 
the institution’s values, objectives, and decisions. But this is not the way that 
religious organizations work. They have appointed officials or representatives 
(though the forms of representation widely) who can take into consideration the 
interests of the community or its members, but once they render a decision, no 
further reference to interests needs to be made. To consider such interests after 
an institutional decision has been rendered is to violate the autonomy of the 
religious institution by substituting the court’s judgment of the interests at stake 
for those of the religious officials.
The concurrent opinion implicitly recognizes this problem with the 
Loyola majority. The Chief Justice and Justice Moldaver seem concerned with 
protecting agents, whether individual or corporate, not inchoate communities. 
The concurrence speaks unequivocally of “Loyola’s freedom of religion” and “the 
religious freedom of Loyola itself.”269 As a result, the concurrence must address 
the problem of discerning the belief of the religious institution itself, since 
“where the claimant is an organization rather than an individual, the ‘sincerity 
of belief ’ inquiry required by our jurisprudence poses some difficulties”270 even 
though “a religious organization may in a very real sense have religious beliefs 
and rights.”271 The concurrence’s solution is to adapt the test of religious sincerity 
laid out in Amselem, with some modifications. While assessing the beliefs of a 
corporate agent is problematic, “an organizational claimant must show that the 
claimed belief or practice is consistent with both the purpose and operation of 
267. Loyola, supra note 9 at paras 60-61.
268. Ibid at para 6.
269. Ibid.
270. Ibid at para 135.
271. Ibid at para 99.
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the organization.”272 Here, the importance of the subjective-objective distinction 
brought up in Amselem is revealed. “It is proper to assess the claimed belief or 
practice in light of objective facts such as the organization’s other practices, 
policies and governing documents. … Therefore, inquiry into past practices 
and consistency of position would be more relevant than in the context of a 
claimant who is a natural person.”273 The result is that the governance of religious 
institutions is made responsive to their formal decision-making structures. This 
may appear undemocratic at first, but it need not be so (since congregational 
religious institutions abound and are, in fact, the norm). In cases where it is 
undemocratic (as in hierarchical churches), deference is warranted precisely on 
grounds of religious liberty, as submission to an ecclesiastical hierarchy may itself 
be the object of sincere religious belief. 
A second vector of disagreement concerns the reach of the protection of 
corporate or institutional religious rights. The spectre of the American reaction to 
Hobby Lobby v EEOC seems to haunt the concurring judges, but the concern was 
already expressed by Chief Justice Dickson in Edwards.274 The majority opinion 
does not have this problem since it is concerned first with the religious interest 
and only tangentially with the religious agent. But the concurrent opinion must 
address it. Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Moldaver’s solution is to restrict 
the application of section 2(a) rights to organizations “constituted primarily 
for religious purposes, and … [whose] operation accords with these religious 
purposes.”275 This caveat does not touch all the core cases, including houses of 
worship or religious schools and charities. These will likely be organized though 
special legislation and declare their purpose in their trust or charter instruments. 
It also does not necessarily exclude all business corporations.276 But even religious 
charities or churches may engage in activities that push the boundaries of the 
religious. Religious universities that train students for secular professions are a 
pressing problem, as the showdown between TWU Law School and the various 
law societies demonstrates. 
Yet the contribution of religious institutionalism to the question of religious 
freedom is not restricted to the autonomy of corporate religious bodies claiming 
religious rights. The institutional dimension of religious liberty concerns the 
272. Ibid at para 138.
273. Ibid at para 139.
274. Edwards, supra note 162 at 153. 
275. Loyola, supra note 9 at para 100.
276. One may imagine a religious bookstore or a kosher or halal butchery successfully arguing that 
its constitutive purpose and operation are inherently religious.
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intrinsically religious body itself. This is the legacy of the tradition of libertas 
ecclesiae. The question of whether a religious corporation may claim a right 
or an exemption under the aegis of religious liberty is answered not by asking 
about the legal form of the group—whether it is a trust, a corporation, or a 
non-profit entity—but by asking whether it is part of “the church” or its 
equivalent. Appreciating the distinction between corporate religious rights 
and religious institutionalism avoids the difficulties identified by Chief Justice 
Dickson in Edwards and reiterated by the concurring judges in Loyola. Respect 
for religious institutionalism is independent of any inquiry into shareholders’ and 
directors’ religious beliefs. Such beliefs will likely be aligned with the purposes of 
the religious body but are strictly speaking irrelevant to the claim brought by a 
religious body in its own right. 
A third vector of disagreement concerns the reliance of both the majority 
and concurring opinions in Loyola on the state of positive law. The majority 
underlines “the character of lawful religious institutions,”277 but what would 
happen if confessional schools were simply abolished, as has been previously 
proposed in Quebec? The conclusion is paradoxical: The rights of religious 
institutions are only respected when those institutions are recognized by law. 
Two arguments might be marshalled to resist this conclusion. The first, following 
the majority, might argue that the rights of religious communities demand that 
the law allow them to create religious institutions to support and preserve the 
community. An alternative argument, more consistent with the tradition of 
religious institutionalism, would consider these institutions to exist independent 
of state recognition, formed according to their own precepts and legal norms. 
The difference is subtle, but it has implications for the legal norms that ought 
to govern the institutions internally. Some religious organizations may easily fit 
into legal categories, such as not-for-profit corporations. But what about religious 
organizations whose internal structures, set up according to religious precepts, do 
not entirely square with the civil form that they have adopted or had imposed 
upon them? This is often the case with hierarchical churches that have a robust 
ecclesiastical legal tradition. Historically, Canadian courts were not consistent 
in the approach they used to review internal church disputes.278 Judges often 
overlooked hierarchical authority and internal church processes, looking instead 
277. Loyola, supra note 9 at para 67. 
278. Recall the deference shown in Ash. See Ash, supra note 128.
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at continuity of doctrine.279 But recently, courts have been less reluctant to turn 
towards ecclesiastical documents to discern the true character of the organization.280 
The model seems closer to the concurrence than to the majority in Loyola, but it 
is too early to tell if the two jurisprudential lines will converge. There is reason to 
hope, however, that the two opinions are not too far apart in application. Both 
signal an institutionalist turn in Canadian jurisprudence. Although each opinion 
understands institutionalism in significantly different ways, even the majority 
acknowledges, in several paragraphs of carefully pondered qualifications, that the 
institutional religious setting demands flexibility and deference to the Catholic 
character of the school even in the teaching of non-Catholic topics. We are now 
a long way from Hutterian.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is not to offer a detailed elaboration of a jurisprudential 
standard for cases involving churches and other religious bodies but only to 
suggest that such a standard must involve consideration of the institutional aspect 
of religious life. One important distinction between religion and conscience 
is that religious claims appeal to sources of authority that the believer places 
outside his or her individual conscience. While these sources of authority can 
be quite abstract (including the divinity directly, without human mediation), in 
practice they are often concrete, worldly institutions like churches, schools, and 
religious bodies. These structures are constitutive of religious belief and necessary 
for its practice. The history of freedom of religion shows this, and current legal 
controversies confirm it. As such, the institutional manifestations of religion 
279. MH Ogilvie, “Church Property Disputes: Some Organizing Principles” (1992) 42:4 
UTLJ 377. The approach used was that of finding an implied trust consistent with the 
original purpose of the congregation, understood in terms of continuity of doctrine. But 
for a reading of the implied trust doctrine arguably more congenial to the way the most 
recent jurisprudence has developed, see Alvin J Esau “The Judicial Resolution of Church 
Property Disputes: Canadian and American Models” (2003) 40:4 Alta L Rev 767 [Esau, 
“Judicial Resolution”].
280. See Pankerichan v Djokic, 2014 ONCA 709, 379 DLR (4th) 42 [Pankerichan]. Pankerichan 
accepted that “Canadian courts will not simply defer to the ecclesiastical judgments of 
church authorities about membership issues without judicially reviewing those decisions 
to ensure that they conform with the internal law of the religious group” (ibid at para 
62, citing Esau, “Judicial Resolution,” supra note 279 at 814. But in nearly all cases, 
examination of internal documents has vindicated the hierarchy. See also Bentley, supra note 
72; Delicata, supra note 99; United Church of Canada v Anderson (1991), 2 OR (3d) 304, 
25 ACWS (3d) 601.
(2015) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL1112
should receive protections that are the same as or similar to those afforded to the 
individual manifestation of religion, especially in the case of religious educational 
institutions so essential to the preservation of communities of faith. These 
institutions should be allowed to claim the protection of their religious freedom 
to constitute themselves in accordance with their tenets, as this is the only viable 
way to protect the religious practice of their congregants.
The status of religious institutions remains a central issue in Canadian 
jurisprudence that will surely soon come back to the courts’ attention. The 
Supreme Court of Canada recently denied leave to appeal an Alberta decision 
asserting the court’s jurisdiction to order the restructuring of a Sikh religious 
society’s membership as a remedy for religious officials’ oppression of individual 
members,281 but such internal disputes are far from rare and the issue is likely 
to come up again soon. Indeed, there is pressure from an increasing number 
of lower court decisions relating to ecclesiastical property disputes, ministerial 
labour contracts, and the parameters of religious services, including religious 
education. Judicial approaches to these cases show no clear doctrinal consistency. 
Courts have given greater deference to the institutional hierarchy of religious 
bodies in property cases282 than in labour cases.283 The record is mixed in religious 
education cases, as illustrated most prominently by the split between courts of 
appeal in Ontario284 and New Brunswick285 over the accreditation of the proposed 
TWU Law School. But there are other cases involving services that a church 
considers central to its religious mission, but that would contravene statutory 
or administrative restrictions286 or be subject to different tax treatment287 if not 
sponsored by a religious body.
We claim that religious institutionalism can help clarify the issues at stake 
in some of these disputes because it better conforms to the historical trajectory 
of the idea of religious freedom, which includes strong claims to autonomy and 
self-governance by religious institutions. Religious institutionalism also helps 
281. Sandhu v Siri Guru Nanak Sikh Gurdwara of Alberta, 2015 ABCA 101, 250 ACWS (3d) 
257, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 36426 (13 August 2015). 
282. See Pankerichan, supra note 280; Bentley, supra note 72; Delicata, supra note 99.
283. See e.g. Kong, supra note 100 at para 50.
284. Trinity Western University v The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONSC 4250, 
254 ACWS (3d) 753.
285. Trinity Western University v Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, 2015 NSSC 25, 
248 ACWS (3d) 952.
286. See e.g. Sarnia v River City Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Sarnia, 2015 ONCA 494, 
254 ACWS (3d) 947.
287. Fondation internationale, supra note 263, leave to appeal to QCCA granted.
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clarify some important ambiguities in the law and fills deep and troubling lacunae 
in current jurisprudence. It makes better sense of the statutory recognition of 
religious institutional authority and the philosophical concern over the nature 
and scope of such authority. The institutionalist conception of religious freedom 
also recognizes that religious institutions have an important structural role to 
play in supporting religious practice and thereby preserving the freedom of 
individual congregants. Therefore, it is necessary to take account of both the 
individualist and the institutionalist strains of religious liberty to give Charter 
protections their due.
The long line of cases in which the Supreme Court of Canada has tried 
to define and delimit the concept of religious freedom has tended to focus 
exclusively on individual freedom of religious conscience and ignored or 
downplayed institutional religious liberty. With the exception of Hutterian, most 
of these cases have not had to confront the institutional dimension head on. This 
made it easier to put aside the doctrinal consequences of constructing a concept 
of religious freedom that only considered individual consciences and ignored 
institutional subjects. Loyola was an excellent opportunity to recognize religious 
institutions but instead revealed the lingering divisions over the status of religious 
organizations. These divisions reflect the need for a historical, conceptual, and 
constitutional framework to deal with religious organizations when individualist 
doctrine does not fit the history and practice of religious bodies. Religious 
institutionalism can provide this framework.

